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Within aviation, a human error classification system theoretically allows researchers to 
analyse post-accident data in an objective yet consistent manner. The primary objective 
of the present study was to explore human error using two widely known classification 
systems - the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HF ACS) and the 
Cognitive Error Taxonomy. It was predicted that the results may elucidate comparative 
differences between military and civilian aviation mishaps, as well as between fixed-
wing and rotary-wing incidents. This research analysed 288 aviation incidents involving 
human error garnered from an Australasian military organization. The results depicteq 
several statistically significant relationships between HF ACS categories in the 
operational level and latent inadequacies at the higher levels. Differences were found 
between fixed-wing and rotary-wing incidents, and between military and civilian 
domains of aviation. 
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Executive Summary 
Over the last three decades, the human factors emphasis within aviation 
accidents has developed from basic skill deficiencies toward higher cognitive processes, 
supervisory deficiencies, and organisational influences. The categorization and 
classification of the kinds of actions and factors now implicated in incident and accident 
analyses has led to the development of numerous frameworks and models. A successful 
classification system should reveal causal and contributing factors to an aircraft 
accident, which in turn can lead to the identification and development of safety 
intervention initiatives. 
Based on Reason's (1990) conceptual theory, the HFACS framework is a 
practical analysis tool to classify the active and latent failures that contribute to human 
error (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). It has been postulated that the focus on inter-
relationships within HF ACS can facilitate the identification of the underlying causes of 
pilot error (Li & Harris, 2006). 
A six-step taxonomy adapted by O'Hare et al. (1994) was also used. While 
HF ACS explores human error in a multi-factor fashion utilizing both active and latent 
failures, the Cognitive Error Taxonomy approach can provide a more detailed analysis 
at the frrst most immediate level, the error itself. 
In a broader sense, the present study addressed the practicality of the 
classification systems as aircraft incident analysis tools. This analysis also allowed for 
comparisons between a number of facets including military and civilian aviation 
mishaps, as well as the potential differences in human error between fixed-wing and 
rotary-wing incidents. The advantages of the proposed analysis were twofold. Firstly, it 
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allowed the presentation of numerical data obtained using a universal coding scheme, 
which offers a more complete understanding of surrounding circumstances and the role 
of human error in military aviation incidents. Secondly, given that the analysis provided 
a comprehensive understanding of incidents as well as an as yet largely uninvestigated 
comparison between military/civil aviation and fixed-wing/rotary wing aircraft 
incidents, it will be an excellent source of information for designing relevant training 
and a useful aid in the advancement of effective prevention strategies. 
This research analysed 288 aircraft incidents involving human error occurring 
during the period 01 January 2001 to 30 June 2008. The HFACS framework and the 
Cognitive Error Taxonomy were applied to classify the contributing factors to the 
incidents. The presence (coded 1) or absence (coded 0) of each of the 19 HF ACS 
categories was assessed for each of the 288 incident descriptions. The cognitive error 
coding involved an algorithm with the first question, "Was there any opportunity to 
intervene?" followed by six subsequent questions on each of the six stages of human 
factor progression from information to decisional to action. The causal factor identified 
was coded as a 1 indicating its presence within the event. In addition, the Cognitive 
Error Taxonomy was used to investigate several performance shaping factors recently 
proposed by O'Hare (2000). It was necessary to engage in training exercises using 
HFACS and the Taxonomy to ensure acceptable levels of reliability. Cohen's Kappa 
calculations revealed relatively high levels of inter-rater agreement. 
Frequency counts of the HF ACS coded data and the data gained from the error 
type classification provided a preliminary assessment. Following this the predictive 
associations of HF ACS categories and aircraft type (fixed-wing or rotary-wing), as well 
as error type and aircraft type was determined using chi-square analysis and Goodman 
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and Kruskall's Lambda (A.) statistic. The Lambda value represents the extent that 
knowing a certain category is present improves the prediction of whether a second 
category is present. To explore the role of performance shaping factors, binary logistic 
regression analyses were performed 
The results showed that rotary-wing aircraft pilots commit proportionately more 
action errors than pilots flying fixed-wing aircraft. It was found that fixed-wing aircraft 
have proportionately more take-off incidents than rotary-wing. When incidents 
involving only fixed-wing aircraft were analysed, 'unusual external conditions' and 
'faulty training for the situation' increased the likelihood of detection errors and 
diagnosis errors respectively. Also, the probability of an action error occurring was 
increased by the presence of the 'no training for the situation' factor. In comparison, 
when rotary-wing incidents were analysed, 'interference from another task' increased 
the likelihood of a detection failure twofold and diagnosis errors were over three times 
more likely to occur if the rotary-wing pilot suffered an 'impaired mental state'. 
No significant differences were found between fixed-wing and rotary-wing 
incidents at organisational or supervisory levels. Nonetheless, using chi-square analysis, 
it was found that aircrew of fixed-wing aircraft had proportionately more 'CRM' 
breakdowns than rotary-wing crew, and proportionately less 'personal readiness' 
failures. It was also found that rotary-wing aircraft pilots committed proportionately 
more 'skill-based errors' than pilots flying fixed-wing aircraft, and proportionately less 
'decision-based' and 'perceptual-based errors'. The relational analysis using the 
Lambda statistic found that 'skill-based' errors were the most influenced by the 
Preconditions of Unsafe Acts. In addition, 'inadequate supervision' was the highest 
level factor that most influenced Preconditions of Unsafe Acts. 
XIV 
Differences were established between the three sectors of aviation examined in 
this thesis. Previous research using HF ACS and the Cognitive Error Taxonomy allowed 
for these comparisons. Especially noticeable was the divergence between military and 
civil aviation domains at the organisational and supervisory levels. Conversely, human 
error and contributory factors at the levels most immediate to the incident event were 
relatively consistent. 
In conclusion, the classification of error can and does have some merit 
practically in the identification of how and where safety initiatives could be 
implemented. The present analysis showed interesting trends and correlations within the 
organisation analysed that may warrant safety intervention. 
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Exploring Human Error and Related Factors of Aviation Flight Safety Events 
Using Post-Incident Classification Systems 
"Human beings by their very nature make mistakes; therefore, it is unreasonable to 
expect error-free human performance." (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997, p.271). 
To err is to classify 
Human Factors in Aviation. Within the context of aviation, human error has 
been estimated to account for between 70 and 80% of accidents (O'Hare, Wiggins, Batt, 
& Morrison, 1994; Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997). In a general sense, any aircraft 
accident or incident involves two components - the aircraft and the aircrew - thus 
causation can be broadly classified as 'mechanical' failure or 'human error' (Taneja, 
2002). Many of us would believe that 'pilot error' and human error are synonymous, 
however, research on accident causation suggests that this assumption is excessively 
simplistic (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001). 
By way of illustration, Rasmussen (1982) noted " .. .if a system performs less 
satisfactory than it normally does - due to a human act or to a disturbance which could 
have been counteracted by a reasonable human act - the cause will likely be identified 
as a human error" (p.313). However, it is well established nowadays that numerous 
sequential factors can be attributed to accidents, generally the last of which is the 
individual aircrew error (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001). 
Over the last 30 years, the focus on the contributing causes of human error in 
aviation psychology has moved from skill deficiencies toward higher cognitive 
processes and organisational factors (Reason, 1990; Li & Harris, 2006). Individuals 
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from the immediate aircrew in the cockpit, air traffic control, and/or maintenance, may 
commit an error (O'Hare et al., 1994). However, according to Reason (1990), these 
'active' errors may be the result of antecedent 'latent' failures already committed by 
supervisors and designers. 
Despite the fact that the overall rate of aircraft accidents has reduced markedly 
over the past 20 years, the decline seen in the accidents associated with mechanical and 
environmental factors has not been paralleled in accidents associated with human error 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997). A specific example of this was demonstrated in 
Shappell and Wiegmann's (1996) study ofU.S. naval aviation mishaps. They found that 
while mechanical and environmental causes of accidents were effectively eliminated 
over the 15-year period 1977-1992, accidents attributable to human error were only 
reduced by 50%, despite being equally likely to be contributory in 1977. Accordingly, 
there has been an increased prevalence in the realization of the contributory nature of 
human factors within aviation incidents and accidents. 
The Nature of Aviation Accidents and Incidents. The operating environment of 
an aircraft can be inherently perilous and merciless (Taneja, 2002). As aviation becomes 
more and more a part of life, the need for an understanding of the nature of accidents 
and incidents also increases. Hansen (2006) argues that human error in aviation 
typically involves three aspects- critical time decisions, significant cost of resources, 
and potentially fatal consequences. 
Fitts and Jones (1947) were the first to use comprehensive empirical analysis to 
evaluate the 'why' of human performance failure in aviation. Nowadays, there are many 
methods of studying human error within the context of aviation. Nagel (1988) outlines 
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four in particular: direct observation, accident data and post-accident analysis, self-
report, and laboratory studies using a simulator. 
"One of the applied psychologist's more pressing tasks is to provide accident 
investigators with better classification of the possible varieties of human failure" 
(Reason, Manstead, Stradling, Baxter, & Campbell, 1990, p.l315). Consequently, the 
question of how to categorize and classify the kinds of actions and factors found in 
incident and accident analyses has arisen. This question has resulted in the development 
of several aircraft accident investigation perspectives and their subsequent frameworks 
(Bird, 1974; Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997; Heinrich, Peterson, & Roos, 1980). Each 
perspective is distinguished by a set of underlying assumptions regarding the nature of 
accidents and human error, which will be discussed later. 
Classification Systems. The basic definition of a classification system within 
aviation could be the categorization of factors, human and/or otherwise, contributing to 
an aircraft accident or incident based on identified characteristics. The system aspect 
refers to the set of procedures that result in a combination of related elements organized 
into a collective whole. In theory, a human error classification system allows 
researchers to analyse the post-accident data in an objective and consistent manner. A 
successful classification system should assist in the recognition of contributing factors 
to an accident, which in turn results in the identification and development of practical 
intervention strategies. 
Within the field of aviation, there is little consensus on the best approach to 
identify and alleviate the 70% to 80% of error attributed to humans. Certainly, it has 
been claimed that there are as many proposed human error models and frameworks as 
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there are people concerned with the issue (S
enders & Moray, 1991). Due to the fact that
 
most aircraft accident reporting systems 
are not designed around a standardized 
theoretical framework of human error, the p
rimary means of analyzing the human role 
in accidents is the examination of data colle
cted after the incident occurrence (Shappell 
& Wiegmann, 1997). As a result of classif
ication systems historically being devised, 
then employed by engineers and operators 
with little human factors experience, these 
systems have generally only been functiona
l from a mechanical viewpoint. That is, the
 
psychology of human factors has been ove
rlooked due to the focus of other areas of
 
expertise. Over recent decades a change has
 been effected in which human factors are 
being considered increasingly causal in
 aviation accidents and consequently, 
classification systems have been adjusted to 
accommodate this realization. 
The effectiveness of classification system
s is centred on the ability to be 
predictive as opposed to merely descriptiv
e of an incident. In providing a predictive
 
model of human error. practitioners can " ..
. significantly reduce vulnerability to error"
 
(Nagel, 1988, p.272). Earlier models of hu
man error, such as Edwards (1988) SHEL 
framework, did not do justice to the extens
ive complexity and richness of the human 
experience. This limitation was a result of 
a lack of insight into creative, emotionally 
driven behaviours. Modem frameworks have
 attempted to capture these mental states to 
counter this possible deficiency. From her
e, the research should attempt to quantify
 
these modem frameworks as reliable and val
id practical tools. 
Benefits of Classification Systems. Classifica
tion systems have traditionally been 
developed for three main functions. Firstly,
 the models and frameworks have enabled 
researchers to reach a new range of understa
nding of human performance in the cockpit. 
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Secondly, classification systems can be utilized to improve equipment design and 
procedural development by allowing researchers a detailed look into what goes wrong 
and why in an accident. Lastly, and most importantly, classification systems can 
identify areas in need of intervention and assist in the development and implementation 
of viable prevention strategies. Overall, classification systems afford a means of both 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of aviation data. 
The cost of a failure within an aircraft may have catastrophic implications. As a 
result of the potential cost of an error within the aviation community, there is a critical 
need to understand and prevent these failures from occurring. Classification systems 
allow for this opportunity that is not possible with other accident investigation methods. 
For example, other methods such as critical-incident examination (Fitts & Jones, 1947; 
cited in O'Hare et al., 1994) and anonymous self-report schemes are potentially subject 
to response bias because the pilots' involved generally just submit their own 
interpretations, thus limiting the capacity to access the full range of errors committed by 
humans in aviation. Response bias, dishonest reporting, or omission can be avoided 
using classification systems that allow investigators to objectively evaluate the pilot's 
actions in addition to a number of other potentially contributory factors within an 
organisation. A direct analysis of post-accident data can potentially afford a very helpful 
insight into the functionality of the technology design within an aircraft. 
Evaluating Classification Systems. Since there has been an absence of a 
standardized collection of objective criteria to measure the function of proposed 
frameworks, very few human error classification systems have been methodically 
validated. Wiegmann and Shappell (200 1) produced five criteria that practitioners may 
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use when comparing classification systems. These five criteria were reliability, 
comprehensiveness, diagnosticity, usability, and validity (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2001). Beaubien and Baker (2002) reached similar conclusions. Together, the five 
criteria provide a set of measurable principles in the assessment of classification 
systems. 
If a classification system is reliable, different individuals should identify similar 
factors in relation to the same accident. This is obviously important as it relates to the 
extent to which a classification system can be validly used by different individuals and 
organisations. Reliability, in terms of inter-rater agreement, can be assessed using 
percentage agreement or if the researcher desires to control for chance, Cohen's kappa 
may be utilized (Landis & Koch, 1977). 
Also important to maintain within a classification system is comprehensiveness. 
Comprehensiveness refers to a classification system's ability to isolate all relevant 
factors proximate to an incident (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). This depends on the 
qualitative level of analysis and is subject to the type of study undergone. For instance, 
organisational frameworks (such as Reason, 1990) encompass factors at a global, but 
not specific, level. In contrast, information-processing frameworks, such as Rasmussen 
(1982), typically provide thorough descriptions at a specific (for example, cognitive 
mechanism) level. 
A classification system with high diagnosticity addresses 'why' an error 
presented, in addition to 'what' happened (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). Thus, trends 
and causes can be identified and in turn, that identification could lead to intervention. 
High diagnosticity is achieved if an intervention is completed based on the factors 
within the sequence that the classification system identified as requiring correction, and 
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if that intervention increases the tolerance of a system to subsequent encounters with 
those factors (Reason, 1990). 
Usability is the practical applicability of a classification system, the extent to 
which it is operational in the real world. Wiegmann and Shappell (200 1) argue such 
aspects as terminology can contribute to this, and that it is easily assessed via those who 
use it in the workplace. A classification system with high usability should promote 
communication between persons utilizing it. The extent to which it solves applied 
problems in the error environment, as well as the expenditure of resources such as time 
and training, also contribute to the usability of a classification system (Beaubien & 
Baker, 2002). 
A successful classification system requires validity. Anastasi (1988) described 
the concept of validity as 'what' a classification system measures, and how adequately 
it does so. Assessing the validity of a classification system is a daunting undertaking, 
however the sum of the above evaluation criteria has been used to infer validity 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). Wiegmann and Shappell (2001) argue that the validity 
of a classification system can be addressed with three types of validity - content, face, 
and construct validity. Content validity concerns whether or not a classification system 
allows for a representative sample of errors to be measured. It also encompasses the 
generalisability of a classification system, for example the capacity for cross-validation 
between data sets. Reliability and comprehensiveness can be used to evaluate content 
validity. Face validity refers to the usability of the classification system. Lastly, 
construct validity conveys the extent to which a classification system reveals 
meaningful and interpretable relationships despite arbitrary fluctuations in the accident 
reports (Beaubien & Baker, 2002). Essentially, construct validity measures how well a 
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classification system achieves its designated objectives of capacity for intervention and 
ability to predict error (Beaubien & Baker, 2002). 
These five criteria (reliability, comprehensiveness, diagnosticity, usability, and 
validity) encompass the recognizable objectives of a classification system - relevant 
factors, rater agreement, practicality, and the explanation of an accident. The 
identification of the criteria allows for the methodical assessment of accident 
classification frameworks. In conclusion, a classification system that meets all the above 
criteria should generate insightful and meaningful answers as to the cause of aircraft 
crashes. 
Evolution of Classification Systems 
The cause and nature of human error within the context of aviation has been 
delineated by several perspectives. The evolution of today's classification systems 
began with the more traditional notions such as behavioural approaches involving 
conditioning and motivation, to ergonomics, which encompass human-machine 
interface and design. More modem approaches were developed, such as psychosocial 
and organisational, as our understanding has deepened. Specifically, five major 
perspectives dominate the literature: ergonomic, aeromedical, behavioural, 
psychosocial, cognitive, and organisational. Each perspective, while possessing both 
advantages and disadvantages, provides an insight into the underlying mechanisms of 
human error within this industry. To reduce the risk of an accident occurring as a result 
of human error, classification and analysis techniques are being implemented. These 
techniques have led to the development of theoretical models and concepts that have 
foundations in the following perspectives. The following sections will outline each of 
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the six primary perspectives, the underlying mechanisms proposed by each, and briefly 
describe the associated classification frameworks. 
Ergonomic Perspective. This perspective advocates the notion that the human 
within a complex system is seldom the singular cause of an accident, rather 
performance is a multifaceted interaction between the numerous facets of a system -
individual, machine, and environment (Heinrich et al., 1980). Edwards (1988) 
demonstrated the practicality of this perspective in his SHEL model, which postulates 
that successful system design and human-machine interaction requires integration 









Figure 1. Edwards (1988) SHEL Model 
As can be seen in Figure 1, each of the components represents a different facet 
of a system including human and environment. Edwards (1988) argued that numerous 
9 
interactions occur between these components in a functioning system, and when such 
interactions are mismatched or degraded, system failures and accidents occur. 
Human factors within the aviation industry has benefited greatly from the 
ergonomic perspective in the pursuit of better human-machine performance. In addition, 
an ergonomic model is generally straightforward and well recognized across disciplines 
including engineering (Edwards, 1988). However, as a result of almost exclusively 
focusing on the design, the other factors of the system garner little to no contemplation. 
The extent of focus on design is largely unwarranted because of the importance of other 
contributory factors. It is impossible to design a perfect error-free system without taking 
these contributory factors into account (Edwards, 1988). 
Aeromedical Perspective. The Aeromedical perspective is human-centred. It 
maintains that errors committed by the aircrew are the result of possible underlying 
physiological and/or mental conditions (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). Such conditions 
are induced by individual illnesses, self-medication, substance abuse, and sleep 
deprivation, which all may result in instances of hypoxia, spatial or visual 
disorientation, fatigue, and the like. Wiegmann and Shappell · (200 1) claim errors are 
symptoms that manifest when certain environmental states activate already existing 
pathogens the pilot may possess. As such, all aspects of the system will be affected 
detrimentally if the pilot is suffering consciously or unconsciously from a pathogen 
(Reason, 1990). For example, if a pilot has the flu his ability to receive and process 
information, communicate with crew, and the like may be affected, which in turn may 
be the reason he commits an error. 
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This perspective has been transformed into analysis models using a medical 
epidemiological approach (Suchman, 1961). Suchman (1961) postulated a method of 
analysis that is analogous to those used in medical research today, involving the 
application of the epidemiological model as an explanation of an accident through the 
host (the error committer), the agent (damage incurred), and the environmental factors. 
Factors, such as fatigue, have been emphasized as pivotal to flight safety using 
similar approaches (Goode, 2003; Graeber, 1988). Stress and the effects of stress on a 
pilot have also been shown to influence flight performance (Sloan & Cooper, 1986). 
Especially disadvantageous to the physiological perspective is the "... general 
lack of appreciation for the role that these variables play when they are present." 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001, p.347). This lack of knowledge of physiological factors 
in aviation means that not only are the certain factors overlooked, but also that the 
factors that are known are not well understood. Not only are the specific levels of 
certain factors relatively ambiguous, it is easier to accept physiological factors as 
contributory rather than causal. 
Behavioural Perspective. Behaviourist theory (Skinner, 1974) maintains that 
performance is based on the motivation to avoid negative consequences and the 
motivation to attain rewards, which is fundamentally different to the human information 
processing and human-machine system integration postulated in other error 
perspectives. An application of this theory within an aviation context may be that 
gaining the aptitude to fly is based on the motivation to perform at an optimal level, and 
thus when that motivation is depleted for whatever reason, performance would decline 
as a result and an error may transpire (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
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Behavioural devices such as rewards, punishment, and motivation can affect 
performance and safety within the aviation environment. For example, if circumstances 
exist that provide incentives for unsafe behaviour, or personnel lack the motivation to 
perform safely, then an error and subsequent accident are liable to occur (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003). Consequently, a rise in the implementation of behavioural-based safety 
programs that reward safe conduct has been observed. 
Nevertheless the major criticism of this perspective is that it is difficult to 
believe that an individual would not be motivated to perform safely, given the often 
fatal consequences of unsafe actions in aviation (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
Psychosocial Perspective. According to this perspective, pilot performance is a 
function of the nature of communication among aircrew and related personnel (Kanki & 
Palmer, 1993). The operational environment, as well as the inherent diversity of the 
attitudes and personalities of the members of each group, affect these interactions and 
therefore affect performance. Earlier models (for example, Haddon, Suchrnan, & Klein, 
1964) of the psychosocial perspective largely concentrated on personality, including a 
concept known as 'accident proneness' contending that some individuals are 
predisposed to committing errors (Koz, 1985; Lardent, 1991). 
The consideration of psychosocial factors in aviation error analysis, led Lautman 
and Gallimore (1987) to conduct a study on behalf of an aircraft manufacturer that 
found over 70% of accidents were a direct consequence of a breakdown in crew 
coordination. With this in mind, a growing appreciation for this perspective has led to 
the development of Crew Resource Management (CRM). CRM training primarily 
focuses on the education of aviation personnel on techniques, such as effective conflict 
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resolution and workload division, that will improve and maintain efficient 
communication between crew and group members (Yacavone, 1993). The effects of 
interpersonal communication and crew interaction are consistently proving relevant as 
accident causal factors (Helmreich, Foushee, Benson, & Russini, 1986). 
The disadvantages of the psychosocial perspective are centered on its broad 
definitions and the lack of empirical support for its models (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2001 ). That being so, it is very difficult to implicate just the one factor, and as a result, 
the psychosocial perspective is often looked at in conjunction with other perspectives. 
Cognitive Perspective. Information Processing Theory lies at the crux of the 
cognitive perspective. The human mind is conceptualized as a system that processes 
information garnered by sensory receptors through a succession of mental operations to 
culminate in response execution (Wickens & Flach, 1988). A failure to process 
information appropriately results in an error. Cognitive models go beyond the base error 
committed and attempt to elucidate the potential underlying causes of that error 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). This is a major advantage of the cognitive approach as 
it permits the assessment of apparently unrelated errors based on fundamental cognitive 
mechanisms, allowing safety practitioners to identify error trends and subsequently 
develop strategies for successful intervention and prevention of accidents (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2001). Another advantage is the generally logical step-by-step approach of the 
models, for example Wickens and Flach's (1988) information processing model and 
Rasmussen's (1982) taxonomic algorithm. 
Wickens and Flach (1988) described a traditional cognitive framework in the 
form of the 'four stage model of information processing', as can be seen in Figure 2. 
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The model is typical of the earlier literature on this perspective. The primary 
characteristic of the model is that information is processed through a sequence of mental 
operations from stimulus input to short-term sensory storage to pattern recognition to 
decision and response selection to response execution. Processing in the latter stages is 
mediated by individual resources of memory and attention (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
1997). It is suggested that the entire process is monitored and adjusted by a feedback 
loop. This model identifies how a pilot might make a decision and allows an accident 
investigator to identify where an error occurred in that process. In a study by Wiegmann 
and Shappell (1997), 86.8% of the pilot errors examined could be classified using the 














Figure 2. Wickens and Flach's (1988) four stage model of information processing. 
Rasmussen (1982) argued that errors resulted from three different levels of 
cognitive control - insufficient skill, misapplication of rules, and/or deficient system 
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knowledge. He developed a taxonomy that classified types of cognitive error by way of 
a progressive stage analysis. O'Hare et al. (1994) adapted the taxonomy into a six-
element algorithm to specifically classify pilot error, which will be described in detail in 
the following sections. 
Cognitively based frameworks, while effective in some respects, are not without 
some drawbacks. The development of objective analysis procedures is currently far 
from being complete, and as a result, accident investigators have to make judgments 
more on assumptions as opposed to evidence (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). Moreover, 
the cognitive approach generally only places emphasis on the individual aircrew error, 
which in many cases may be undue. Contextual, physical, and managerial factors (over 
which the individual often has no control) are not addressed by cognitive models 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001 ). This begs the question, if the cognitive approach was 
used in conjunction with other perspectives to produce a framework, would such a 
holistic system be able to successfully isolate the causes of an accident and 
subsequently provide intervention and prevention strategies effective enough to reduce 
error within the aviation community 
Organisational Perspective. Previously the primary emphasis and concern of 
aviation safety practitioners has been the aircrew and the aircraft they fly (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003). Nowadays the increasing knowledge of error causation has led to the 
implication of numerous other factors including the function of organisations and 
managerial personnel. Organisational models incorporate not only the fallible decisions 
and actions committed by the immediate contributors of a system, but those made by 
the supervisory players within the organisation as well (von Thaden, Wiegmann, & 
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Shappell, 2006). Organisational theorists maintain that in general, the management of 
an organisation is tasked with the identification and allocation of work, in addition to 
the determination, measurement, and necessary correction of performance standards to 
ensure the task gets done (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). If management is unsuccessful 
in completing these responsibilities, failings are liable to occur at subsequent levels of 
an organisation, eventually leading to the immediate causes of an accident. That is, the 
underlying causes of operational errors are grounded in management failures (von 
Thaden, Wiegmann, & Shappell, 2006). 
The organisational perspective and its subsequent frameworks offer a number of 
beneficial dynamics to the aviation community. In particular, the organisational 
perspective gives access to the long established field of Industrial and Organisational 
psychology where the improvement of worker behaviour through selection, training, 
and organisational design, and the control of the quality, quantity, and cost of 
production have been researched for decades (Heinrich et al., 1980). These principles 
and methods that have been developed to prevent unsafe acts within the industrial 
context may prove constructive in reducing human error within the aviation context 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Another advantage of organisational models is the 
inclusion of Operational Risk Management (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
Determining the amount and the type of risk particular errors impose on safe operations 
allows them to be independently identified and analysed. The potential errors can then 
be categorized and managed accordingly. 
Bird's (1974) 'Domino Theory' arguably is one of the most well known 
organisational models of human error. The premise of this model holds that an accident 
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occurs as a result of the natural culmination of a series of invariably fixed states 
(Heinrich et al., 1980). 
Bird (1974) postulates that in effect accidents occur like a sequence of falling 
dominos, each domino representing an unsafe state, where the preceding domino 
directly effects the toppling of the next one. Specifically, the model consists of five 
'dominos' representing the cascading nature of error beginning with the safety and 
managerial control of operational losses through to basic and intermediate causes to the 
actual accident and finally to injury/loss (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
With the recognition of the potentially pivotal role organisations and 
management plays, several similar frameworks have been built on these foundations 
(Adams, 1976; Degani & Weiner, 1994; Reason, 1990; Weick & Roberts, 1993). 
Adams (1976) expanded on Bird's (1974) theory through the addition of identifying 
elements to the management structure, operational errors, and tactical error so as to have 
the ability to more thoroughly assess the relative contributions to accident causation by 
operators and management. Adams (1976) essentially 'operationalised' Bird's (1974) 
Domino Theory (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Degani & Wiener (1994) created an 
organisational approach expressly for flight deck operations. The model employs 
similar ideas to the aforementioned frameworks, focusing on the correlations between 
management philosophy, policies, procedures, and operator practices- the four "P's", 
all of which Degani and Wiener (1994) argue interact to produce flight safety. If there is 
a conflict between the four "P's", an accident may occur. 
Despite the apparent benefits and applicability of the organisational approach, 
criticisms do exist. Due to the fact that human failures at an organisational level are 
frequently physically (for example, not in the cockpit) and temporally distant from the 
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operator error, it is difficult for accident investigators to establish the necessary links 
between the organisational factors and aircrew failure (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). 
As such, the practicality of the theoretical models in this perspective may be limited in 
that reduction and prevention techniques cannot be readily implemented. Also, it has 
been argued that organisational frameworks promote the examination of only a single 
type of human error - managerial fallibilities - and consequently pilots lose their 
culpability. This further reduces the practicality of models of this perspective, as even 
minor incidents will be accountable to the organisation. Nevertheless, factors at this 
level should not be overlooked. 
Perhaps the most famous and certainly the most dominant model of this 
perspective is Reason's (1990) 'Swiss Cheese' framework, and its recent adaptations 
into the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System by Wiegmann and Shappell 
(1997), describing four levels of human failure. These will be extensively discussed in 
the following sections. 
Recent Transfers to Practicality 
Human performance taxonomies were primarily designed to assist the 
classification of human factors in aviation accidents and incidents. The taxonomies 
were established with the intention of developing data-driven interventions. Examples 
ofthese taxonomies include the HFACS (Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997), Approach-and-
Landing Accident Reduction form (Khatwa & Helmreich, 1998) and Threat and Error 
Management Line Operations Safety Audits (Klinect, Murray, Merrit, & Helmreich, 
2003). 
18 
Aircraft accident/incidents reports are accessed and the official causal factors are 
coded into corresponding HF ACS categories. Practically, this coding is performed on 
an entire sample of reports and summaries are formed. Beaubiem and Baker (2002) 
argue that because HF ACS has sound theoretical grounds in human error it may be 
adaptable to a number of confidential reporting schemes (for example, ASRS and its 
U.K. equivalent, ClllRP). 
Another taxonomy that has shown potential as a practical tool is the Approach-
and-Landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) form (Khatwa & Helmreich, 1998). This tool 
specifically aims to identify the causes of accidents in the approach and landing phases 
of flight. While including numerous factors in the data collection, the ALAR form has 
the benefit of identifying and distinguishing between primary and contributory factors. 
Additionally the ALAR form makes a distinction between accidents and incidents, 
which Beaubiem and Baker (2002) argue is valuable in determining interventions in 
terms of outcomes. However, it should be noted that the practicality of this taxonomy is 
limited by its extensive length and the fact that it does not include all phases of flight. 
Threat and Error Management (Klinect et al., 2003) is a slightly different, but no 
less effective, approach to aircraft accident and incident analysis and prevention. Threat 
and Error Management is a set of safety values as well as a collection of applied 
techniques (Klinect et al., 2003). It was developed in conjunction with Line Operations 
Safety Audits, which again provides a data-driven tool that identifies operational 
strengths as well as vulnerabilities. First used in 1996, it has provided a periodic trend 
analysis of commercial aviation and is now widely known (Klinect et al., 2003). 
Nagel (1988) proposed error models and taxonomies had to meet three basic 
criteria to be able to successfully aid in the diagnosis of an aviation accident. The first 
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was that the model is descriptive and predictive. The second criterion was that systemic 
research from all areas of relevance must be considered; including behavioural, 
cognitive, psychosocial, ergonomic, aeromedical, and organizational. And thirdly, the 
model must contain the 'why' of an error in order to assist in the implementation of an 
effective prevention strategy. The above examples are just a few of the many models 
that meet these criteria utilized in the aviation industry nowadays. 
A Modern Classification System and a Cognitive Error Taxonomy 
The 'Swiss Cheese' Model of Accident Causation. Reason's (1990) 'Swiss 
Cheese' model of accident causation is an extensively referenced human error 
framework for safety practitioners. Originally constructed for use in the nuclear power 
industry, Reason's (1990) model unifies the assorted aforementioned perspectives and it 
is theoretically applicable throughout industrial settings and within the aviation context. 
Essentially, the 'Swiss Cheese' illustration is a modernized adaptation of Bird's (1974) 
Domino theory in which an accident is said to occur as the culmination of a series of 
unsafe states throughout the levels of an industry. The fundamental assumption of the 
model is that the four elemental aspects of an organisation (Latent - Organisational 
Influences, Unsafe Supervision, Preconditions of Unsafe Acts; and Active - Unsafe 
Acts of the Operator) must coincide concurrently as a 'productive system' (Reason, 
1990). If there is a failure at one level, the subsequent levels will be affected in turn. 
Within the aviation setting, safe flight can be viewed as the product of the 
system (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). The frontline operators of the system - in the 
case of aviation; the aircrew, and the system environment, the cockpit, - are essential 
components of the error analysis. According to the model, certain preconditions must 
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also be present, as pilots exist as a constituent within different organisations, rather than 
the sole factor (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Incorporating the organisational 
perspective, the managerial decision-makers who delineate the competing objectives of 
productivity and safety, as well as the organisation itself, are considered in this model as 
latent causes (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Accidents occur as a result of a failure 
between the interactions of each component (Reason, 1990). As depicted in Figure 3, 
these failures are illustrated as "holes" in the levels of the productive system giving the 
model its 'Swiss cheese' image. 
ORGANISATIONAL INFLUENCES 
UNSAFE SUPERVISION 
Latent Failures PRECONDITIONS OF UNSAFE ACTS 
Laten Failures 
Failed or absent defenses 
Active Failures 
UNSAFE ACTS OF OPERATORS 
Mishap or 
Accident 
Figure 3. The "Swiss cheese" model of human error causation (adapted from Reason, 1990). 
While Reason's (1990) model encompasses each error perspective and is widely 
cited, there are several identifiable criticisms. Firstly, it does not define the specific 
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nature of the 'holes' (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). This is a major limitation of the 
model as without the knowledge of each failure it is very difficult to further prevent the 
possible resulting unsafe acts at the preceding and subsequent levels. Secondly, the 
model is primarily descriptive, rather than analytical, and therefore the practicality is 
somewhat minimal (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). That is, accident investigators find it 
problematical to apply the framework to the real world. It is essential for safety 
professionals to be able to define the particular failures within the system so they can be 
recognized and, if necessary, corrected during an investigation. 
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). The HFACS 
framework was developed with the intention of producing an applicable model of 
Reason's (1990) conceptual theory, which proposed that active and latent failures 
within a system both play a causal role in human error. Active failures are the specific 
unsafe actions of operators, whereas latent failures are committed in the upper 
management levels of an organisation and can lie dormant within a system for extended 
periods of time (Reason, 1990). As HF ACS purportedly bridges the gap between theory 
and practice, it is postulated that the focus on inter-relationships within a system 
facilitates the identification of the underlying causes of pilot error (Li & Harris, 2006). 
To ensure practicality within the aviation community, the framework's creators 
Shappell and Wiegmann (1997) identified and defined the 'holes in the cheese' at each 
of the four levels of human error described by Reason (1990). The causal categories for 
each of the levels of failure (see Figure 4) were described: 1.) Unsafe Acts, 2.) 
Preconditions of Unsafe Acts, 3.) Unsafe Supervision, and 4.) Organisational 
Influences. 
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Figure 4. The HFACS Framework 
The first level of HF ACS is the 'Unsafe Acts of Operators', commonly 
expressed within aviation as pilot error. This stage is divided into two categories: Errors 
and Violations, which are in turn divided into different sub-categories. 
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Errors are classified by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) as 'mental or physical 
activities of individuals that fail to achieve their intended outcome' (p.SO). They can be 
separated into 'skill-based', 'decision-based', and 'perceptual-based' errors. Skill-based 
errors are grounded in basic flight skills that occur without significant conscious 
thought. These skill-based actions are particularly vulnerable to failures of attention 
and/or memory, as well as technique errors. Examples of 'skill-based errors' could be 
over-correction, breakdown in visual scan, failure to prioritise attention and omission of 
items from a checklist (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Decision-based errors occur 
when a state is ambiguous and therefore not recognised or is misdiagnosed, and 
consequently the pilot applies the wrong strategies or procedures (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003). That is, although an intentional behaviour transpires, the behaviour is 
not adequate or appropriate for the situation. 'Decision-based errors' also occur when 
inadequate knowledge of airccraft systems is present as well as when the correct 
procedure exceeds the ability of the pilot (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Finally, 
Perceptual-based errors involve the degradation of sensory input or when that input is 
not 'usual' and perception of the world differs from reality (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2003). Examples include visual illusions, and spatial disorientation. 
Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) define violations as 'the willful disregard for the 
rules and regulations that govern the safety of flight' (p.55). Such violations are further 
divided into two types: 'routine' and 'exceptional'. Routine violations have a habitual 
propensity and are often tolerated by managerial authorities (Reason, 1990). In contrast, 
exceptional violations emerge as a rare divergence from an expected behaviour pattern 
(Reason, 1990). 'Exceptional violations' are not sanctioned by the governing authority. 
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The second level of HF ACS is the 'Preconditions of Unsafe Acts of Operators'. 
Three factors, with corresponding definitions, are considered in analysis -
Environmental Factors, Personnel Factors, and Conditions of Operators. 
Environmental Factors refer to both the physical and technological aspects of a 
pilot's surroundings. The 'physical environment' comprises the conditions within the 
cockpit, which includes temperature and vibrations, and the like, as well as the 
operational settings, such as weather, altitude and terrain (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2003). The 'technological environment', on the other hand, encompasses a number of 
issues including the display/interface characteristics, the layout of checklists and 
automation, and the design of controls (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
The main Personnel Factors considered in HFACS are 'Crew Resource 
Management (CRM)' and 'personal readiness'. As described earlier, 'CRM' is an 
important aspect of psychosocial functioning within aviation. Due to the number of 
individuals typically present in the cockpit of an aircraft, human to human interaction is 
a necessary component. 'Personal readiness' refers to the physical and/or mental 
preparation for duty. Examples of a breakdown in this category that could contribute to 
an accident may be inadequate training, poor dietary practices and overexertion while 
off duty (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
The Condition of the Operator can impinge on optimal performance. These 
conditions that affect functioning include 'adverse mental states' (personality traits, risk 
seeking, and insidious attitudes), 'adverse physiological states' (hypoxia, illness, 
intoxication, motion sickness, and medication effects, to name a few), and 
'physical/mental limitations'. The final condition encompasses situations when the 
requirements for safe flight exceed the capabilities of the pilot. Reaction time and basic 
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sensory and information processing limitations are examples of this classification, as 
well as the basic aptitude and mental ability to fly (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
The third level of HF ACS is 'Unsafe Supervision'. This level further integrates 
Reason's (1990) model and the organisational perspective that managerial failures are 
potentially instrumental in accident causation. Thus, four different supervisory failures 
are identified by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) in the HF ACS framework: Inadequate 
Supervision, Planned Inappropriate Operations, Failure to Correct a Known Problem, 
and Supervisory Violations. 
Inadequate Supervision occurs when an individual in a supervisory role fails to 
afford their personnel the guidance, training, leadership, oversight, and incentives, 
needed for safety and efficiency (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Planned Inappropriate 
Operations refers to incongruous operational timing or crew rest scheduling such that 
individuals are put at risk (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Failure to Correct a Known 
Problem pertains to instances where although management recognise certain 
deficiencies among safety-related areas they allow them to continue unabated 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). And lastly, Supervisory Violations are when a 
supervisor wilfully disregards existing rules and regulations (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2003). 
The fourth and final level of HF ACS is 'Organisational Influences'. This level is 
divided into three facets: Resource Acquisition/Management, Organisational Climate, 
and Organisational Process. Each represents factors that occur in a mishap if the 
communications, actions, or policies of upper-level management affect supervisory 
practices, which in turn affect the operator resulting in system failure, human error or an 
unsafe situation (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997). Resource Acquisition/Management 
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refers to the maintenance and management of organisational resources including elements 
such as human, monetary, equipment, and facilities. Organisational Climate 
encompasses the many organisational variables that directly or indirectly influence 
operator performance, essentially the prevailing environment of the organisation. It can 
be delineated into three aspects - command structure, policies, and culture. 
Organisational Processes are the formal procedures of an organisation. Again, this 
factor can be divided into three categories - operational risk management, procedures, 
and oversight. Regardless of the fact that the classifications of error in this level are 
fundamentally intangible and inherently inferred, safety can be comprised as a result of a 
failure in each latent condition described above. 
Research Applications of HF ACS 
While HF ACS was originally developed for the analysis of military aviation 
accidents in the United States (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997), it has since been adapted 
and applied in commercial aviation (Gaur, 2005; Shappell, Detwiler, Holcomb, 
Hackworth, Boquet, & Wiegmann, 2007), general aviation (Lenne, Ashby, & Fitzharris, 
2008), maintenance (Krulak, 2004), and railway safety investigation (Baysari, 
Mclntosh, & Wilson, 2008; Reinach & Viale, 2006). The purpose of the current study is 
to define and describe the possible differences between the three main sectors of 
aviation by providing a detailed analysis of HF ACS within a military context using 
techniques provided by research in general and commercial aviation. 
Lenne et al. (2008) described general aviation as consisting of " ... all 
nonscheduled flying activity ... other than that performed by the major domestic and 
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international airlines" (p.342), and commercial aviation as including " ... charter, 
agriculture, flight training, and other aerial work" (p.342). For the present study, the 
definition of commercial aviation was expanded to include air carrier operations and 
commuter/on-demand operation (Shappell et al., 2007). Lastly, military aviation is 
simply the operation of any aircraft by a military organisation. 
Military Aviation. Despite its wide acceptance in recent times, the organisational 
perspective on human error has garnered limited empirical support thus far due to the 
lack of statistically significant fmdings. Li and Harris (2006) attempted to rectify this 
using the HF ACS framework. In particular, they set out to show the statistical 
associations between the organisational structures delineated in HF ACS and the actual 
errors committed by aircrew. 
Li and Harris (2006) applied the HF ACS framework to the narrative data from 
523 Republic of China Air Force accidents. Each factor at all four levels was classified 
by two trained coders as either present (1) or absent (0), and reliability statistics 
(Cohen's Kappa) were calculated. Goodman and Kruskall's (1954) Lambda statistic 
was used to calculate the proportional reduction in error (PRE). This value essentially 
reflects the ability to predict the prevalence of a lower level factor occurring from a 
higher-level factor. Therefore, the predictive association between the levels of HF ACS 
could be statistically analysed. Finally, Li and Harris (2006) computed odds ratios to 
provide an estimate of likelihood of the presence of a factor in one category occurring 
concurrently with a factor in another category. It should be noted that odds ratios were 
only calculated on statistically significant lambda values. 
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A high kappa value was found for 14 of the 18 factor categories, indicating 
substantial agreement (Li & Harris, 2006). Further reliability analysis showed between 
72.3% and 96.4% agreement rates. PRE was found to be in excess of 5% (which was 
the statistically significant critical value) in 10 different areas, which can be seen in 
Table 1. There was one association between level 4 and level 3 of the HF ACS 
framework ('organisational process'/' inadequate supervision') with the odds ratio 
suggesting that poor supervisory practices were 13.5 times more likely to occur when 
associated with poor managerial processes. There was also one association between 
level 3 and level 2 ('inadequate supervision' /'CRM') with the odds ratio suggesting that 
poor supervisory processes were 12.8 times more likely to subsequently result in poor 
'CRM'. And finally, there were eight associations between level2 and level 1 ('adverse 
mental states' /'decision-based errors' and 'skill-based errors'; 'physical-mental 
limitations' /'decision-based errors' and 'skill-based errors'; 'CRM' /'decision-based 
errors' and 'skill-based errors'; 'personal readiness' /'decision-based errors' and 'skill-
based errors'). These associations had correspondingly high odds ratios as well. 
Li and Harris (2006) concluded that there were statistically significant 
associations between factors at higher organisational levels, the psychological 
contributory factors, and the errors committed by pilots that resulted in accidents. These 
results suggest that interventions at the lower levels of HF ACS would have limited 
effect in improving overall safety practices. For example, CRM practices would be 
unlikely to be improved unless the adequate supervision (level 3) and organisational 
processes (level4) were in place to provide facilities, oversee CRM training, monitor its 
effectiveness, and respond to any further changes necessary in the training program (Li 
& Harris, 2006). 
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Table 1. Li and Harris' (2006) Significant values for Goodman and Kruskal's Lambda with 
Corresponding Odds Ratios for the HFA CS Framework 
Significant associations between upper levels and adjacent lower 
level classifications ofthe HFACS Framework 
HFACS Level4 association with Level3 classifications 
Organisational Process x Inadequate Supervision 
HFACS Level3 associations with Level2 classifications 
Inadequate Supervision x Crew Resource Management 
HF ACS Level 2 associations with Level I classifications 
Adverse Mental States x Decision-based Errors 
Adverse Mental States x Skiii-based Errors 
Crew Resource Management x Decision-based Errors 
Crew Resource Management x Skill-based Errors 
Physical/mental Limitations x Decision-based Errors 
Physical/mental Limitations x Skiii-based Errors 
Personal Readiness x Decision-based Errors 
























General Aviation. "General aviation accidents represent 70% to 90% of all 
aviation accidents" (Lenne et al., 2008, p.342). In a recent study, Lenne et al. (2008) 
applied HFACS to this sector of aviation. HFACS was used to analyse 169 general 
aviation crashes in Australia. The main aims of the study were to identify the 
contributory factors of GA accidents, and statistically examine the error types and their 
existing relationships across the four levels of HF ACS (Lenne et al., 2008). A panel of 
three aviation experts coded the reports garnered from filed GA insurance claims over 
an 18-month period. Frequency counts and assessments using chi-square of the nature 
of relationship, if any, between the four levels of HF ACS were calculated. Odds ratios 
were also calculated to test the likelihood of the presence of a factor occurring given the 
presence of a factor at a higher HF ACS level, similar to the Li and Harris (2006) study 
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discussed above. Other variables, such as phase of flight in which the error was 
committed and the like, were also collected and analysed. 
On the whole, 'skill-based errors' were evident in 61% of cases, with 'decision-
based errors' in 36%. 'Perceptual-based errors' (16%) and 'violations' (16%) were 
reported in proportionately fewer cases at the level of Unsafe Acts of Operators. 
HF ACS level 2 Preconditions of Unsafe Acts were found in 60% of cases, whereas 
level 3 Unsafe Supervision and level 4 Organisational Influences were present in only a 
small proportion of cases. The authors found that the presence of HF ACS level 2 
categories 'adverse mental states', 'physical and mental limitations', and 'personal 
readiness' were significantly associated with HF ACS level 1 categories of 'skill-based' 
and 'decision-based' errors. 'Violations' were found to be more likely to occur if 
'CRM' failures were present. 
The main finding of relevance from the research within the arena of general 
aviation accidents was the typical lack of presence of factors from the upper levels of 
HF ACS. This is expected due to the fact that most sectors of general aviation are 
privately, as opposed to organisationally, operated. That is, the pilots flying them often 
own the aircraft operated within the general aviation sector. As a result, the pilot is not 
only the frontline operator but also, by HF ACS definition, responsible for supervisory 
and organisational factors. HF ACS does not allow for this transgression of levels, which 
subsequently means the pilot/owner is viewed only as a frontline operator. 
Consequently, there is an absence of upper level factors. 
Commercial Aviation. Shappell et al. (2007) aimed to extend previous analyses 
using HF ACS beyond general and military aviation to integrate commercial aviation, 
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and to examme annual relationships using the framework and traditional accident 
investigation variables. They used 13 years of data on commercial aviation accidents. 
The frequencies and percentages of accidents that involved at least one instance of an 
HF ACS category were calculated. Human causal factors of commercial accidents were 
heavily represented in the first two categories of HF ACS - Unsafe Acts of Operators 
and Preconditions of Unsafe Acts - in particular 'CRM' and 'physical environment' 
categories. Notably however, organisational influences of accidents were predominantly 
characterized by inadequacies in 'operational (organisational) processes'. Supervisory 
factors were not distributed as would be suggested by the framework either; a 
disproportionate trend towards the single category of 'inadequate supervision' was 
evidenced (Shappell et al., 2007). 
Gaur (2005) conducted an analysis of commercial aviation accidents in India for 
the period 1990-1999. The most common type of error reported for Unsafe Acts of 
Operators was 'skill-based' (52.1%), followed by 'decision-based errors' (20.8%), and 
'perceptual-based errors' were only reported in seven accidents (14.6%). Preconditions 
of Unsafe Acts were reported as present in 47.9% of accidents. As shown in the 
preceding study, supervisory and organisational factors featured more commonly in 
commercial aviation. Unsafe Supervision was accounted for in 25% of the reported 
accidents, and Organisational Influences contributed to 52.1% of cases. 
Li, Harris, and Yu (2008) conducted essentially the same analysis as the Li and 
Harris (2006) study described previously. However, commercial aviation accidents in 
China were examined in the place of military accidents. Six significant associations 
were found between level 4 and level 3 of the HF ACS framework (Organisational 
Influences and Unsafe Supervision). Three associations between level 3 and level 2 
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(Unsafe Supervision and Preconditions of Unsafe Acts) were established as significant. 
And finally, seven associations were significant between level 2 and level 1 
(Preconditions of Unsafe Acts and Unsafe Acts of Operators). These associations all 
had correspondingly high odds ratios as well, and can be viewed in Table 2. 
Table 2. Li, Harris, and Yu 's (2008) Significant Chi-square tests of Association and associated values for 
Goodman and Kruskal's Lambda with Corresponding Odds Ratios for the HFACS Framework 
Significant associations between upper levels and adjacent Chi Square Lambda Odds 
lower level classifications of the HFACS Framework Ratio 
Value pValue 
HFACS Level4 association with Level3 classifications 
Organisational Process x Planned Inappropriate Operations 15.105 .000 0.500 2.813 
Organisational Process x Inadequate Supervision 22.563 .000 0.667 9.000 
Organisational Process x Failed to Correct a Known Problem 10.408 .001 0.200 9.500 
Organisational Process x Supervisory Violation 20.251 .000 0.667 3.000 
Resource Management x Planned Inappropriate Operations 14.009 .000 0.500 2.500 
Resource Management x Inadequate Supervision 10.777 .001 0.333 10.857 
HFACS Level3 associations with Leve12 classifications 
Planned Inappropriate Operations x Physical Environment 8.946 .001 0.421 7.367 
Inadequate Supervision x Crew Resource Management 9.744 .001 0.231 8.250 
Supervisory Violation x Personal Readiness 10.752 .001 0.000 0.000 
HFACS Level2 associations with Levell classifications 12.476 .001 0.000 0.000 
Adverse Mental States x Decision-based Errors 12.476 .001 0.000 0.000 
Adverse Mental States x Skill-based Errors 10.124 .001 0.045 12.000 
Adverse Mental States x Perceptual-based Errors 20.882 .000 0.583 43.333 
Crew Resource Management x Decision-based Errors 20.882 .000 0.583 43.333 
Crew Resource Management x Skill-based Errors 17.973 .000 0.583 27.778 
Crew Resource Management x Violations 10.896 .001 0.500 10.000 
Physical Environment x Perceptual-based Errors 12.476 .001 0.000 0.000 
Previous studies within general aviation have not shown the same prevalence of 
Organisational Influences and Unsafe Supervision that these studies found. Nonetheless 
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aircrew error most commonly took the form of 'skill-based errors', as has also been 
displayed in earlier studies in both general aviation and military settings (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 1997, 1999, 2001 ). 
Evaluating the HFACS Framework 
Understandably, the applicability of a framework is entirely reliant on its 
practicality in an operational setting. As mentioned previously, five criteria have been 
developed to assess the usefulness of classification systems. 
If a classification system has high reliability then its application should result in 
a consensus on contributory factors from different users. As previously noted, Li and 
Harris's (2006) study had well established Cohen's kappa values between two 
individual judges, with correspondingly high percentage agreements. 
Comprehensiveness, or the ability to capture all the information relevant to an 
incident, can be assessed in a iterative process by applying different frameworks to an 
accident to identify unaccounted-for human factors, if any (Shappell & Wiegmann, 
2001). HFACS, itself, is the result of a thorough development process from a primary 
focus on the Unsafe Acts of Operators (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997; Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 1997) to the extensive classification system covering all levels of an accident 
described above (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
Diagnosticity allows trends and causes to be identified, which in turn allows 
intervention strategies to be developed and put into practice. Shappell, Wiegmann, 
Fraser, Gregory, Kinsley, and Squier (1999) adequately demonstrated this evaluative 
criterion in their study involving U.S. Navy/Marine Corps tactical aircraft (TACAIR) 
and rotary-wing mishaps. It was noted that 35% of the mishaps analysed had the 
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presence of a 'violation', in contrast to U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army aviation mishaps 
involving 'violation' (7% and 27% respectively). As a result of these findings, an 
intervention program to effectively reduce 'violation' was implemented in the 
Navy/Marine Corps across the board (that is, including the managerial chain as well as 
aircrew). In 1998, it was found when HF ACS was again applied to incidents that the 
percentage of 'violations' committed had halved at 17% (Neubauer, Murdock, Fraser, & 
Veronneau, 1998). 
Usability is the practicality of a classification system. Essentially, the usability 
of a classification system is reflected in how regularly it is employed and how easy it is 
to use (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001). Since its inception, HFACS has been readily 
utilized in a number of both military and non-military domains. In addition, throughout 
its employment as an accident investigation tool, HF ACS has been continually assessed 
and adjusted based on feedback from training reviews and from operators (Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2001). HFACS is represented in a logical hierarchical structure, which may 
be less cognitively taxing on those utilizing it in the field (Beaubien & Baker, 2002). 
A good classification system should maintain satisfactory content, face, and 
construct validity. These concepts are relatively difficult to assess. Shappell and 
Wiegmann (2001) have proposed that the acceptable standards of HFACS in the other 
areas of the evaluative criteria demonstrate the validity of the framework. 
Notwithstanding the above qualifications, HFACS does have its limitations. 
Firstly, it is problematical to distinguish effects from causes, because HF ACS does not 
identify the sequence of events (Beaubien & Baker, 2002). Secondly, Beaubien and 
Baker (2002) argue that HF ACS coding scheme for each classification may be too 
unrefined to recognize the specific nature of certain incidents and therefore, to suggest 
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remedies for those incidents. And thirdly, it has been difficult to collect data from 
accident reports relevant to the upper levels of HF ACS, which have been identified as 
increasingly important to facilitating change within an aviation organisation (Beaubien 
& Baker, 2002). If analysed, the shorter, often less detailed narratives included in 
incident reports would likely intensify this limitation. 
Cognitive Error Taxonomy 
As mentioned previously, an inherent limitation of accumulated human factor 
reports in the setting of aviation is that the information only becomes available after 
accidents have transpired (O'Hare et al., 1994). Therefore, it is imperative to develop 
theoretically-grounded analytic tools that not only identify error, but also provide 
predictive potential of the limitations in cognitive processes that may affect optimal 
performance. While HF ACS delineates error in a multi-factor fashion using the four 
different levels, the Cognitive Error Taxonomy approach can provide a more detailed 
analysis at the first most immediate level, the error itself. 
Rasmussen (1982) elucidated a logical means of identifying the type of 
information processing failure in an accident. He devised the algorithm after studying 
nuclear power plant operator errors (Zotov, 1997). The Cognitive Error Taxonomy was 
developed from an input-to-output model of operation, mediated by 'transfer functions' 
(Rasmussen, 1982). 'Transfer functions' of the human operator were distinguished as 
perception then mediation (planning) followed by motor function. This simple model 
was then modified to include the aspect of intention. This aspect allows for the 
interpretation of subjective goals and performance criteria (Rasmussen, 1982). 
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O'Hare et al. (1994) adapted the Rasmussen (1982) algorithm with the intention 
of applying it specifically to aviation accidents. The adapted algorithm was represented 
as a six-step taxonomy. The identified initiating event of the incident was related to 
each step. The initiating event is the first identifiable point where the flight goes from 
normal to abnormal. The first question, "Was there any opportunity to intervene?" is 
followed by six subsequent questions on each of the six stages of human information 
progression. Using the step-by-step basis of the taxonomy, when a question was 
answered as 'No' the corresponding error was recorded as the main contributory factor. 
The second step constitutes the first potential information processing failure. If a pilot 
does not observe incoming relevant information from the changing state of the aircraft, 
a detection error is committed. The next step results in a diagnosis error if the pilot 
misinterprets the system state information. At this juncture, the pilot must set an 
appropriate goal given the system state. If an inappropriate goal is selected, a goal error 
is made. The means of accomplishing the selected goal is known as a strategy. If the 
approach is unsuitable for the goal plan, an error in strategy is realized. Let's say the 
pilot has received and interpreted all relevant information correctly, made the right 
decision for the situation, and chosen the correct plan to achieve that goal, but he has 
not executed the procedure as intended. This is known as a procedural error, and it is the 
sixth step of the taxonomy. Finally, the last step is an action error, which is essentially a 
skill-based error involving an inaccurate response execution. 
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No 
Opportunity for intervention? Mechanical Failure 
Yes 
No 
Detection of cues from changed system state? Detection Error 
Yes 
No 
Accurate diagnosis of new system state? Diagnosis Error 
Yes 
No 
Choice of reasonable goal? Goal Error 
Yes 
No 
Strategy which will achieve goal selected? Strategy Error 
Yes 
No 
Procedures consistent with strategy selected? Procedure Error 
Yes 
No 
Execution of procedures as intended? Action Error .. . . 
Ftgure 5. The Cogmt1ve Error Taxonomy for class1fymg the stage of cogmt1ve failure . 
Research Applications of the Cognitive Error Taxonomy. O'Hare et al. assessed 
the applicability of this simple error model in their 1994 study involving a sample of 
general aviation fixed-wing aircraft. Of the 373 mishaps coded, 15% of human errors 
were classified as detection errors, 10% as incorrect diagnosis of system state, 15% as 
incorrect goal errors, erroneous strategy selection accounted for 19% of errors, 
procedural error was the most frequent at 26%, and 15% were errors of action (O'Hare 
et al., 1994). Interestingly, they found that when the incidents were categorized in 
accident severity, decisional (goal) errors accounted disproportionately for 33% of 
fatal/serious mishaps, and only 11% of minor/nil mishaps. 
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Other researchers have employed the taxonomy. Zotov (1997) successfully 
applied the taxonomy to official accident reports in a large New Zealand database 
submitted between 1965 and 1990. The applicability of the Cognitive Error Taxonomy 
shown by Zotov (1997) was reflected in its adoption by the New Zealand Civil Aviation 
Authority as part of the current accident analysis system (O'Hare, 2000). Of the 289 
pilot-causal factors analysed by Wiegmann and Shappell (1997), 91.3% were able to be 
classified by the Cognitive Error Taxonomy. Their findings replicated O'Hare et al. 
(1994) in that procedural errors were found to be the most frequent (39.48%). 
O'Hare (2006) published a comprehensive study utilizing the Cognitive Error 
Taxonomy and with an analysis of 10 additional performance shaping factors (PSFs). 
This collection of factors was based on Rasmussen's (1982) Performance Shaping and 
Situational Factors. By definition, performance shaping factors are " ... general 
conditions which may influence error probability, but ... do not cause errors" 
(Rasmussen, 1982, p.328). There are two types ofPSFs- situational (for example, task 
nature and environmental considerations) and human-centered (for example, training 
effects and physiological/mental limitations). The situational factors included 
'distractions from another person', 'distractions from another source', 'interference 
from another task', 'unusual internal conditions', and 'unusual external conditions'. The 
personal factors were 'physical incapacitation', 'impaired mental state', 'excessive 
workload', 'no training for the situation', and 'faulty training for the situation'. 
The self-report data collected from 1,144 licensed pilots around New Zealand 
were associated with a " ... personally experienced critical in-flight event" (O'Hare, 
2006, p.148). All participants completed a questionnaire based on the taxonomy, 
followed by 10 questions related to a collection of flight demands and the capacity of 
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the pilot to meet those requirements (O'Hare, 2006). It was found that incidents were 
more frequently cited as attributable to detection or diagnosis error, whereas accidents 
tended to be more likely associated with goal or strategy error (O'Hare, 2006). The 
three most cited performance shaping factors were: 'task interference', 'external 
environment', and 'lack of training'. The least cited performance shaping factor was 
'physical incapacitation'. 
Current Research 
Rationale. Overall, the rationale for the present study was to retrospectively 
explore the relationship between human error and military aviation incidents using two 
well-known and widely accepted accident classification systems. The present study also 
addressed the practicality and applicability of the classification systems as aircraft 
incident analysis tools. In addition, the application of HF ACS (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2001) and the Cognitive Error Taxonomy (adapted by O'Hare et al., 1994) allowed for 
comparisons between a number of facets. Specifically, this analysis elucidated 
comparative differences between military and civilian aviation mishaps, as well as the 
potential differences in human error between fixed-wing and rotary-wing incidents 
within the military domain. 
The cost of an aircraft accident is often large. Consequently, there is a critical 
need to prevent these failures from occurring. Classification systems provide a direct 
analysis of post-accident data, which affords a unique insight into why an incident 
transpired. In terms of assessing the practicality of these analysis tools, it is imperative 
to remember that a successful classification system should assist in the recognition of 
contributing factors to an accident. By identifying these factors, and the possible 
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relationships between these factors (Li & Harris, 2006), a classification system provides 
the aviation industry with a means of isolating the best approach for future prevention 
of aircraft accidents. 
According to Dekker (2001a), the endeavor to map complex human behaviour 
into broad conceptual categories and implicating preconditions as well as supervisory 
and organisational factors only creates an illusion of deeper understanding. Despite this, 
classification systems are widely used and so the focus has moved to establishing valid 
and reliable tools with an emphasis on practicality. Accident analyses now attempt to 
elucidate trends and correlations within aviation organisations to help define the 
implementation of safety initiatives. Classification systems may or may not be practical 
to use as analysis tools. Previous studies have found that classification systems do have 
some practical value (Li & Harris, 2006; O'Hare, 2006; Shappell et al, 2007, Wiegmann 
& Shappell, 2003). The purpose of the present study was to further establish HF ACS 
and the Cognitive Error Taxonomy as applicably reliable and valid. 
Comparative Analyses. The operation of fixed-wing aircraft is fundamentally 
different to the operation of rotary-wing aircraft. While the differences in the operation 
of these aircraft types are well understood, the potential divergence in the human error 
mechanisms relevant to fixed-wing versus rotary-wing incidents remains relatively 
unexplored. This poses the questions: Are there fundamental differences between 
human error and performance in incident occurrences in rotary versus fixed-wing 
aircraft? Are pilots more likely to commit one type of error in a certain classification of 
aircraft (fixed or rotary)? And, using HF ACS, is it possible to delineate differences 
between fixed and rotary-wing aircraft at latent stages of contributory factors? It is 
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important to find the answers to these questions to aid in the realisation of safety 
interventions and achievements, and to therefore maintain a high level of performance 
in a potentially hazardous domain. 
Furthermore, previous research usmg HF ACS and the Cognitive Error 
Taxonomy allows us the opportunity to compare military aviation incidents with 
civilian aviation incidents. In theory, if one sector was experiencing less of a certain 
error type then its strategies for reducing that error could concievably be successful. 
Therefore, it follows on from this that if another sector of aviation is plagued with the 
same error mechanisms, applying the srategies working in the first sector would have 
some positive impact. 
Design. A database involving the flight safety incidents of an Australasian 
military organisation were utilized for the current analyses. Each incident included a 
narrative description, possible causes of the event, aircraft classification (fixed or 
rotary), conditions, and the amount of damage sustained. The database primarily 
contained reports of military aircraft-related incidents. 
The reported HFACS analyses were based procedurally on Li and Harris's 
(2006) study. Li and Harris (2006) applied the HF ACS framework described earlier to 
the narrative data from 523 Republic of China Air Force accidents to establish 
associations between the organisational structures and the actual errors committed by 
aircrew. Goodman and Kruskall's (1954) Lambda statistic was used to predict the 
prevalence of a lower level factor occurring from a higher-level factor. This relational 
analysis essentially provides a possible starting point for future interventions. 
Interventions just at the active levels of the error will not provide the same effect as 
42 
interventions that consider latent failures. In addition, to allow for comparisons between 
civilian and military aviation, the proportional frequencies were calculated for each 
HF ACS category, similar to Shappell et al.'s (2007) study. 
The Cognitive Error Taxonomy analysis in the current study was largely based 
on O'Hare et al.'s (1994) and O'Hare's (2006) procedure. Again, by utilizing an 
established procedure, comparisons between civil and military aviation incidents were 
made. O'Hare (2006) based his analysis on a simple step-by-step taxonomy 
questionnaire. The only difference between the present analysis and O'Hare's (2006) 
analysis was that the present study processed the incident narratives and then applied 
the taxonomy, whereas the earlier study had the incident pilots self-report by way of the 
taxonomy. 
Summary. The present study was designed to retrospectively evaluate aircraft 
incident data using two classification systems. These classification systems provide a 
means to analyse and subsequently interpret human error. Previous studies have found 
that classification systems are practical analysis tools (Li & Harris, 2006; O'Hare, 
2006; Shappell et al., 2007, Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). The present study addressed 
the practicality and applicability of HFACS (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001) and the 
Cognitive Error Taxonomy (adapted by O'Hare et al., 1994). This analysis also 
elucidated potential differences between military and civilian aviation incidents, as well 





Aircraft-related incident reports were acquired from a flight safety incident 
database maintained by an Australasian military organisation. With beginnings in 1964, 
the database had evolved through various names and improvements until the early 
1990s when it was made electronic. It was instituted with the intention of gaining a 
deeper understanding about the causes of aircraft incidents and potential safety 
deficiencies, as well as increasing the provision of prevention strategies. The primary 
findings by the original investigators of the database have so far been used to identify 
the causes of an incident and to implement actions that minimize the chances of 
reoccurrence. 
The reporting functions were based on the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation standards and recommended practices with additional local-oriented 
processes. Any aircraft-related safety incident may be reported in the database. The 
primary individuals involved in the event voluntarily report the flight safety incidents in 
the database, and following this those involved in the operations and technical 
investigations of the incident also provide input. Trained flight safety investigators 
review the report with the principal responsibility of ensuring the correct use of codes 
and terminology, as well as to confirm every aspect of the incident has been considered. 
The sensitive nature of the reports is taken into account at all times and policy is in 
place to ensure the data are only used for learning and preventative measures as 
opposed to say, discipline. This encourages reporting and balances the voluntary aspect 
of the database. 
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Currently, from 01 January 2001 to 30 June 2008, the database holds 2840 flight 
safety incidents. General yearly trends have seen an increase in the number of reports 
each year, which could be a result of a number of factors including the improvement of 
reporting culture (with an emphasis on learning rather than blame), as well as the 
operation of older aircraft. The electronic database is stored on a Sequel Backend 
server. A Microsoft Access front end user interface is employed for data entry and 
analysis. 
Electronically stored incident accounts from 01 January 2001 through to 30 June 
2008 were included in the analyses. Incidents from these years were utilised as 2001 
was the first year the flight incident database became electronically accessable and 
subsequently narratives became more detailed. Years before 2001 contained hardcopy 
reports, with limited narrative description. A flight safety incident was defined by the 
implementers of the database as an occurrence that either has the potential to affect 
flight safety or has directly resulted in damage and/or injury. Each event includes a 
domain specific description of all flight safety incidents, possible causes of the event, 
aircraft type and categorical damage incurred, as well as the incident conditions. Basic 
information, such as time and date of incident, phase of flight, pilot-in-command 
experience and flight hours, are also detailed in the reports. 
Approximately 500 flight safety incidents involving human factors were 
submitted to the first analysis. Human factors flight safety incidents were described 
within the database as involving aircrew. All other causal factors such as mechanical 
were omitted. Only incidents containing a complete narrative and consisting of 
identified causal factors were admitted for further investigation. Furthermore, given that 
the focus of this research was aircrew error, incidents with undetermined causes were 
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omitted from consideration. Finally, only incidents that occurred whilst in a non-
grounded phase of flight, or that directly influenced a non-grounded phase of flight, 
were included. For example, if an error occurred during the preflight, and was shown to 
influence airborne operations, that incident was then included. Of the 500 or so reports, 
288 incidents conformed to the above requirements. 
The primary aim of this study was to investigate the techniques used to analyse 
aviation mishaps, not to analyse the incident reports contained within an existing 
database. It was not my intention to provide alternative analysis or to generate 
additional causal factors. As the expertise of the pilot, engineer, and safety officer was 
used in each incident narrative, a high level of relevant and essential information is 
contained within each incident report. Thus an analysis of the incident report may 
gamer results applicable and practical to aviation research in the future. 
Confidentiality and Ethics Approval 
A confidentiality agreement was established so that the sensitive nature of 
involvement in aircraft mishaps was protected. The organisation from which the data 
were gathered for and from will remain nameless also. Due to the fact this thesis is 
available to the public upon completion, the Australasian military organisation felt that 
the privacy of the individuals involved in the incidents reported on the database might 
be breached to a damaging extent. Furthermore, should the public interpret confidential 
military information in the wrong way, the integrity of the organisation could be bought 
into question. Therefore, a database was developed in Excel into which all the 
numerical coding collected from the narratives was entered with all identifying markers 
removed. 
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Descriptive incident data were extracted and recoded numerically. Examples of 
the descriptive data include the most commonly mentioned variables such as year of 
occurrence, aircraft type (fixed-wing or rotary-wing), aircrew experience in terms of 
flight hours, environmental conditions such as visual meteorological conditions or 
instrument meteorological conditions, and crash severity, which was entered on a scale 
of "1 =no damage" to "5 = severe damage". Data obtained from the narratives, which 
included a synopsis of the incident, pilot choices, circumstances, and outcome, were 
coded according to the reported 'purpose and phase of flight' at which the incident 
occurred. Instances of this included 'manoeuvre', 'aerobatics', 'climb', 'cruise' and 
'take-off. The development of the aforementioned coding categories was loosely based 
on Lenne et al.'s (2008) categories, which were established from American and 
Australian National Transport Safety Board recommendations. 
Ethical approval for this project was provided by the Head of the Department of 
Psychology, University of Otago (see Appendix E) and by the Chief of the organisation 
involved. 
Human Factor Classification 
Two frameworks were used to classify the human factors contributing to aircrew 
error; the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HF ACS) based on 
Reason's (1990) organisational model and developed by Wiegmann and Shappell 
(1997), and the Cognitive Error Taxonomy, developed by Rasmussen (1982) and 
adapted by O'Hare et al. (1994). 
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Human Factors Analysis and Classification System. Wiegmann and Shappell's 
(2003) refined HFACS framework was used in this study. As described previously, the 
framework consisted of four operational levels of human error classification; 1) Unsafe 
Acts of Operators, 2) Preconditions of Unsafe Acts, 3) Unsafe Supervision, and 4) 
Organisational Influences. Each level is further sub-categorised, as shown in Figure 4. 
The presence (coded 1) or absence (coded 0) of each of the 19 HF ACS 
categories was assessed for each of the 288 incident descriptions. For instance, in 
assessing the fourth level Organisational Influences of HF ACS an organisational 
process factor may be identified as present for a specific event, but no resource 
acquisition/management or organisational climate factors. The coder would then place 
a one in the box indicating organisational process, and zeroes in the other boxes of the 
fourth level. The coding form utilized can be viewed in Appendix D. 
Cognitive Error Taxonomy. The cognitive error coding involved a series of 
questions based on the taxonomic algorithm of O'Hare et al. (1994), which was 
described in the introduction. Firstly, each step was considered in relation to the 
identified initiating event of the incident. The initiating event is defined as the point 
where the flight went from normal and routine to abnormal. The first question, "Was 
there any opportunity to intervene?" was followed by six subsequent questions on each 
of the six stages of human factor progression from information to decisional to action 
incorporated in the model. The causal factor identified was coded as a 1 indicating its 
presence within the event. That is, using the step-by-step basis of the taxonomy, when a 
question was answered as 'No' the corresponding error was recorded as the main 
contributory factor. For example, the coder reviews the incident and decides 'Yes' there 
was 'opportunity for intervention'. He/she then moves to the next question 'detection of 
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cues from changed system state?' which the pilot failed to do, so the coder answers 
'No' based on the evidence presented in the narrative, thereby the pilot has committed a 
'Detection Error'. 
Secondly, the Cognitive Error Taxonomy was used to investigate several 
performance shaping factors, both situational and within the person, recently proposed 
in a taxonomy of human error by O'Hare (2000). The situational factors included 
'distractions from another person', 'distractions from another source', 'interference 
from another task', 'unusual internal conditions', and 'unusual external conditions'. The 
personal factors were 'physical incapacitation', 'impaired mental state', 'excessive 
workload', 'no training for the situation', and 'faulty training for the situation'. The 
coder indicated the presence (coded 1) or absence (coded 0) of each performance 
shaping factor for each separate incident. The coding form for the Taxonomy can be 
reviewed in Appendix C. 
It is important to note that the original incident data were not being 
reinvestigated or reinterpreted, only coded according to the above classification 
systems. The coding was in turn analysed to answer the questions proposed earlier. 
Coding Process 
The coding process began with several training exercises in which accident 
reports were coded independently by two coders for both the decisional taxonomy and 
HF ACS. It was necessary to engage in these training exercises to familiarize the coders 
with HF ACS categories and definitions, as well as to ensure high levels of 
corroboration between an expert and a novice coder. That is, one of the coders was used 
as a benchmark to understanding the processes due to his level of expertise and 
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experience. This allowed for quality control of the coding and incident analysis. The 
aforementioned coder has 25 years experience as an aviation psychologist, with 
multiple publications and ongoing research within aviation, in addition to being a 
qualified glider and fixed-wing pilot. In contrast, the second coder had no flight 
experience or previous experience in human factors classification. This was paramount 
to objective coding, because the second coder therefore had no preconceived notions 
about the classification systems utilized in the study. In effect, the purpose of the 
preceding coding exercises was to train the novice coder to a reliable level. It also 
demonstrates the internal validity of the algorithms used in that it is generally 
maintained that novices with nominal training can reliably use classification systems 
that have a high internal validity (O'Connor, 2008). 
To ensure a detailed and accurate understanding of the HF ACS categories and 
the Cognitive Error Taxonomy definitions, each coder spent approximately three hours 
training on the HF ACS framework using the definitions provided in Appendix A and 
Appendix B. This training involved standardizing and discussing what each category 
comprised of, and instructed practice with feedback using five case studies. Once 
completed, the coders then independently attempted some incident example cases, the 
details of which will be explained shortly. The example cases involved approximately 
100 commercial aircraft accident narratives obtained from the Transport Accident 
Investigation Commission New Zealand (T AICNZ). 
The initial step in coding was identifying the point during the flight when the 
state changed from normal to non-normal, or 'the event'. Then, using the incident report 
narrative, the presence (coded 1) or absence (coded 0) of each HF ACS category was 
assessed for each accident description, as it would be in the official analysis. To avoid 
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overrepresentation in any one accident, each HF ACS classification was maximally 
counted once per single accident as an indication of its presence or absence. To assess 
the decisional taxonomy, the coder first noted the initial unsafe event and then indicated 
the presence (coded 1) of the corresponding error according to the answers obtained 
progressively from the taxonomy. In addition, any performance shaping factors were 
also identified. For both coding exercises, only those causes and contributing factors 
identified in the original narrative were included. However, in those narratives where it 
was reasonable to make an inference as to embedded human errors, codes were assigned 
accordingly. 
Once a high level of agreement was obvious between the coders, 14 test cases 
(5%) were randomly selected from the database of incidents to be coded (n = 288). The 
coding was completed and statistically analysed to ascertain inter-rater reliability using 
Cohen' s Kappa. Only 5% of the cases were selected, firstly to preserve the number of 
incident reports for formal analysis, and secondly because a high level of agreement had 
already been shown using the TAICNZ data. It was also necessary to ensure that the 
coding was reliably and validly generalized to the military organisation's incident data. 
Inter-rater reliabilities for HF ACS were calculated on a category-by-category 
basis using Cohen's Kappa, as can be seen in Table 3. When using this statistic, a value 
of 1 indicates perfect agreement whereas a value of 0 indicates that agreement is no 
better than chance. The values presented in Table 3 had a two-sided p value of <.05 
which is significant and thus, the null hypothesis that there is no agreement was 
rejected. However, the asymptotic two-sided p value is not very accurate for such a 
small dataset. Cohen' s Kappa can produce misleadingly low findings where the 
agreement is very high between coders or when the sample size is small (Li & Harris, 
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2006). Therefore to allow for clearer interpretation, inter-rater reliabilities were also 
calculated as a basic percentage of agreement. 
Table 3. 




Level3: Unsafe Supervision 
Level2: Preconditions of 
Unsafe Acts 







Failed to Correct a Known Problem 





Crew Resource Management 
Physical/Mental Limitation 
Adverse Physiological States 



























A kappa value of 0.60 was exceeded in 15 of the 19 HFACS categories, 
indicating substantial agreement between coders (Landis & Koch, 1977). Percentage 
agreement further indicated satisfactory reliability between the raters, with 18 of the 19 
values obtained ranging between 78.6% and 100%. 
Additionally, inter-rater reliability was calculated to ascertain the level of 
agreement between the expert coder and the novice coder for the error taxonomy and 
the performance shaping factors. The coder's agreement on the presence of performance 
shaping factors was 1 00% for the 14 test cases. However in the case of the taxonomy, as 
there were seven potential categories to choose from, and for kappa to exist according to 
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its definition, each of the coders needed to have used each of the seven categories at 
least once. To allow for this a larger sample size of 30 randomly selected incident 
reports (1 0%) from the incident database was implemented. Cohen' s kappa was 
calculated at .685, with a percentage agreement on error type at 73.3%, indicating 
reliable assessments between the coders. 
Based on the above reliability analyses it was decided that the novice coder had 
reached a satisfactory level of classification systems knowledge and understanding to 
analyse and code the official military incident data. 
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Results and Discussion 
The general purpose of the following analyses was to demonstrate the practical 
functionality of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System, and the 
Cognitive Error Taxonomy, as tools in the assessment and classification of aviation 
incidents from an Australasian military organisation. 
Frequency counts of the HF ACS coded data and the data gained from the error 
type classification provided a preliminary assessment. Following this the nature of the 
relationships between HF ACS categories and aircraft type (fixed-wing or rotary-wing), 
and between error type and aircraft type was determined using chi-square analysis. 
The proportional reduction in error (PRE) was calculated by means of Goodman 
and Kruskall's Lambda (A) statistic. The PRE is the increased accuracy (or the 
'reduction in error') in predicting the characteristics of a sample with one variable if the 
parameters of a preceding variable are known, as compared to when the parameters are 
not known. This value essentially reflects the ability to predict the prevalence of a lower 
level factor occurring from a higher-level factor's presence (Li & Harris, 2006). That is, 
when used in the analysis of categorical data, the Lambda value represents the extent 
that knowing a certain category is present improves the prediction of whether a second 
category is present (Li et al., 2008). 
The predictive association between the levels of HF ACS could be statistically 
analysed in this way. A lambda value of 1 indicates that the independent variable 
perfectly predicts the dependent variable. A lambda value of 0 indicates that the 
independent variable is of no assistance in predicting the dependent variable. Lambda is 
an asymmetric or 'directional' measure, which essentially denotes that the value of 
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lambda depends on which variable is considered the dependent variable. 
In accordance with the theoretical suppositions of HF ACS, the lower level 
classifications were assumed to be dependent on the classifications of the immediately 
higher level within the framework (Li et al., 2008). That is, the lower levels were the 
assumed dependent variable. For interpretive purposes, categorical influence was 
denoted by PRE values in excess of zero. PRE values in excess of 5% were considered 
to denote stronger categorical influences (Li & Harris, 2006). 
In addition, odds ratios were computed to provide an estimate of the likelihood 
of the presence of a factor in one category occurring concurrently with a factor in 
another category. Odds ratios are a measure of effect size (Li & Harris, 2006) and 
therefore were used to illustrate the strength of association. It should be noted that odds 
ratios were only calculated on statistically significant lambda values, as they are an 
asymmetric measure and therefore only theoretically significant when in association 
with meaningful Lambda values (Li et al., 2008). 
Of the 288 incident sample, approximately two thirds of aircraft reported were 
fixed-wing (N= 194) with the remaining third were rotary-wing aircraft (N= 94). 
Error Classification 
Each of the 288 incidents involving human error was assessed against O'Hare et 
al.'s ( 1994) taxonomic algorithm to classify the type of cognitive failure. There were six 
stages of human error: detection, diagnosis, goal, strategy, procedure, and action. 
A chi-square analysis of the complete taxonomic findings was computed. 
Figures below the expected count of 5 were excluded, as were missing data values. It 
was found that rotary-wing aircraft pilots commit proportionally more action errors than 
55 
pilots flying fixed-wing aircraft, and proportionally less goal and strategy errors 
x2(11.1, 3,p = .011). 
Post-hoc chi-square analyses (Keppel & Saufley, 1980) were conducted 
using small component (2x2) contingency tables. Using this design it was possible to 
isolate a specific error type by collapsing the five other error types into a single factor. 
The differences between fixed- and rotary-wing were investigated for each of the six 












Taxonomic Error Type 
• Fixed 
• Rotary 
Figure 6. Percentages of error type classification at each stage of the taxonomy for fixed-wing and rotary-
wing incidents. 
Detection Errors. Errors coded as detection failures account for 10.8% of the 
taxonomic findings. That is, 10.8% of errors committed by aircrew were due to the fact 
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that the informational cue indicating a change in flight from normal to non-normal was 
not detected. Detection errors were responsible for 12.9% of all fixed-wing aircraft 
incidents, which was double the proportion of detection errors committed in rotary-wing 
aircraft incidents (6.3%). 
Diagnosis Errors. Failure to accurately diagnose the new non-normal state that 
characterized an incident resulted in a diagnosis error. Overall, diagnosis errors were 
found to comprise 4.9% of all incidents for the specified time period. Rotary-wing 
incidents were coded with only slightly less diagnosis failures than fixed-wing (3.2% 
and 5.6% respectively). 
Goal Errors. Goal errors contributed to 24.3% of the 288 incidents assessed 
using the taxonomic algorithm. Specifically, 25.9% of the narratives for fixed-wing 
incidents reported that aircrew had erroneously decided on a goal given the 
circumstances ofthe flight. Similarly, 21.1% ofthe narratives for rotary-wing incidents 
indicated that a goal error had been made. 
Strategy Errors. Failures in general strategies accounted for 5.9% of the coded 
errors. That is, 5.9% of the aircrew selected the wrong strategies to achieve the desired 
goal in any given situation. In the case of rotary-wing incidents, 2.1% of errors 
committed were associated with inappropriately selected strategy. Fixed-wing incidents 
had over three times the proportion of strategy failures (7.8%). 
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Procedural Errors. Procedures that were not consistent with the strategy 
selected were found to account for 21.5% of aircrew failures. Rotary-wing narratives 
(23.2%) were reported to contain marginally more instances of this type of error than 
fixed-wing narratives (20.7%). 
Action Errors. Actions errors occurred as a result of aircrew not executing 
procedures as they intended, and comprised 30.2% of the taxonomic findings. Action 
errors were accountable for 44.2% of all rotary-wing incidents, which was 
approximately two times higher than the proportion of action errors incurred in fixed-
wing incidents (23.3%). A post-hoc Chi-square analysis showed that fixed-wing pilots 
were reported as proportionally less likely to commit an action error than rotary-wing 
pilots x.2(11.79, 1, p = .001). No significant differences were found for the other error 
types. 
Finally, seven incidents (2.4%) attributable to human error were unable to be 
categorised into the taxonomy. These were labeled as uncodable. 
Phase of Flight 
The phase of flight data used in this analysis was restricted to only those 
incidents involving a state of flight. Thus, all human error committed during the 
preflight ground phase or post-landing phase of any one particular incident were 
omitted from the first chi-square analyses. This was the result of very low numbers in 
these categories. Of the 288 incident narratives used in the analysis, 34 (11.8%) were 
not classified into a phase of flight. These 34 cases were left out of the following 
analysis. 
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Using a chi-square analysis, it was found that fixed-wing aircraft had 
proportionately more take-off incidents than rotary-wing, and proportionately less 
cruise and landing incidents x2(6.11 , 2,p = .047). 
Again, post-hoc chi-square analyses (Keppel & Saufley, 1980) were conducted 
to isolate and consequently examine a specific flight phase by collapsing the two other 
flight phases into a single factor. All flight phases were utilized in these analyses - take-
off, cruise, and landing. The differences between fixed and rotary-wing were 



























• Fixed Wing 
• Rotary Wing 
Figure 7. Percentages of error committed during a phase of flight for fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft 
incidents . 
Take-Off Take-off included terms from the reports such as 'take-off and 
'climb' in the incident narratives. The percentage of human error committed during 
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take-off was 28.7%. There was a large discrepancy between fixed-wing (27.3%) and 
rotary-wing (13.4%) failures during take-off, suggesting fixed-wing aircrew are 
proportionally more likely to commit an error in the course of take-off than rotary-wing 
aircrew. A post-hoc Chi-square analysis showed that rotary-wing incidents were 
reported as proportionally less likely to occur during take-off than fixed-wing incidents 
z2(6.64, 1,p = .01). No significant differences were found for the other flight phases. 
Cruise. Key words associated with the cruise phase of flight included: 'cruise', 
'aerobatics', 'maneuver', and additionally in the case of rotary-wing aircraft, 
'autorotation' and 'hover'. Errors incurred in 'cruise' contributed to 58% of the total 
count across the three phases of flight. Within the cruise phase of flight, failures in 
rotary-wing aircraft and fixed-wing aircraft both accounted for approximately half each 
of the errors committed. 
Landing. Terms used in the incident narratives that were associated with the 
landing phases included: 'descent', 'final approach', 'initial approach', 'landing', and 
'overshoot'. Overall, the percentage of errors that occurred during the landing stage of 
flight was 41.1% of reported human failure. There were proportionately more errors in 
the landing phase of flight of rotary-wing (37.8%) than fixed-wing (29.3%). 
Performance Shaping Factors 
The presence of each contributory performance shaping factor m incidents 
involving both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft can be seen in Figure 8. 
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The performance shaping factors identified most often as contributing to an 
incident were 'no training for situation' (18.4%), 'distractions from another source' 
(14.6%), 'interference from other task' (15.6%), and 'unusual external conditions' 
(21.2%). Least identified were 'unusual internal conditions', which was associated with 
4% of incidents. 
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Performance Shaping Factors 
Figure 8. Percentage of occurrence for each potential performance shaping factors for fixed-wing and 
rotary-wing incidents. 
Personal Performance Shaping Factors. Of the performance shaping factors 
reported, fixed-wing operations had more instances in seven of the ten categories. 
Fixed-wing incidents had proportionally more reports of the demand factors specific to 
the pilot, specifically 'physical incapacitation' (3.1% compared to 0% reported in 
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rotary-wing incidents), 'impaired mental state' (8.3% and 5.3%, respectively), and 
'excessive workload' (9.8% versus 5.3%). 
Rotary-wing incidents were classified as containing more performance shaping 
factors concerning training than fixed-wing incidents. For example, circumstances in 
which the pilot's knowledge or skills were incorrect ('faulty training') were reported 
9.5% of the time in rotary-wing incidents as opposed to 6. 7% in fixed-wing incidents. 
Lastly, there was one other significant difference between fixed-wing and rotary-wing 
performance shaping factor presence and that was 'no training for the situation'. It was 
more likely that a rotary-wing pilot had no experience for the incident situation than 
fixed-wing pilots (25.3% versus 15%), x2 (4.44,1,p = .035). 
Situational Performance Shaping Factors. The environmental performance 
shaping factors also occurred more frequently in fixed-wing incidents. In this case, 
fixed-wing pilots were significantly more influenced by 'unusual external conditions', 
such as turbulence, than rotary-wing pilots (24.9% versus 13.7%), x2(4.77, 1,p = .029). 
'Unusual internal conditions' such as vibration and heat were very rarely reported as 
contributory factors in occurrences (1.6% fixed-wing incidents and 1.1% rotary-wing 
incidents). 
The workload demand factors largely involved distractor variables. 'Interference 
from another task' ( 16.1% fixed and 14.7% rotary) and 'distractions from other source' 
(16.1% and 11.6%, respectively) illustrate the distractor variables were cited more in 
fixed-wing operations. Interestingly, the 'distractions from other person' factor were 
more frequently associated with rotary-wing incidents (3.2%) than with fixed-wing 
(1%). 
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Binary Logistic Regressions 
To further explore the role of performance shaping factors, binary logistic 
regression analyses were performed. The predicted variable was error type (detection, 
diagnosis, goal, strategy, procedure, and action) and the predictor variables were the 10 
performance shaping factors ('physical incapacitation', 'impaired mental state', 
'excessive workload', 'no training', 'faulty training', 'distraction from other person', 
'distraction from other source', 'interference from other task', 'unusual internal 
conditions', and 'unusual external conditions'). The results of these analyses can be 
found in Table 4. 
The binary logistic regression analyses were conducted on all incidents 
combined, with additional analyses on fixed-wing incidents and rotary-wing incidents 
separately. In the combined incident analyses, the models were not significant for 
predicting failures in diagnosis, goal, strategy, or procedure. Nevertheless, the models 
were successful in predicting detection and action errors. In particular, 'interference 
from another task' and 'unusual external conditions' increased the likelihood of a 
detection error. The possibility of an action error occurring was increased by the 
presence of the 'no training for the situation' performance shaping factor. 
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Table 4. Significant Findings of the Binary Logistic Regression Analysis: Factors Predicting Error Type 
for All Incidents, Fixed-wing Incidents, and Rotary-wing Incidents. 
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When incidents involving only fixed-wing aircraft were analyzed, predictors for 
failures in detection, diagnosis, and action were found. Specifically, 'unusual external 
conditions' and 'faulty training for the situation' increased the likelihood of detection 
errors and diagnosis en·ors respectively. Again, the probability of an action error 
occurring was increased by the presence ofthe 'no training for the situation' factor. 
Finally, the separate analysis of rotary-wing incidents produced no significant 
fmdings for the prediction of goal, strategy, procedure, or action errors from the 10 
performance shaping factors. However, the models were successful in predicting 
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failures in both detection and diagnosis. In fact, 'interference from another task' 
increased the likelihood of a detection failure twofold and diagnosis errors were over 
three times more likely to occur if the rotary-wing pilot suffered an 'impaired mental 
state'. 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
A summary of HF ACS factor occurrence frequency and proportional 
percentages for fixed- and rotary-wing, as well as overall occurrence, can be found in 
Table 5. The ensuing analysis will be set out with a description of absolute values first, 
followed by comparisons of the findings between fixed-wing and rotary-wing incidents 
for each category. 
Notably, from the results described above, immediate or proximal factors such 
as aircrew actions and both environmental and personal preconditions were more 
frequently mentioned in the narratives than latent supervisory and organisational 
factors. Nevertheless, this does not make the latter any less contributory to incident 
causes (Reason, 1990). 
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Table 5. Frequency and Percentage of Incidents Associated With Each HFACS Causal Category by 
Aircraft TYPe and Total Percentage of Incidents Associated With Each HFACS Causal Category. 
HFACSCATEGORY %(N) 
Fixed (N=l93) Rotary (N=95) Total (N=288) 
ORGANISATIONAL INFLUENCES 29.9 (86) 
Resource Acquisition/Management 10.4 (20) 11.6 (11) 10.8(31) 
Organisational Climate 5.7 (11) 6.3 (6) 5.9 (17) 
Organisational Process 12.4 (24) 14.7 (14) 13.2 (38) 
UNSAFE SUPERVISION 37.2 (107) 
Inadequate Supervision 24.9 (48) 25.3 (24) 25.0 (7) 
Planned Inappropriate Operations 9.3 (18) 9.5 (9) 9.4 (27) 
Failure to Correct a Known Problem 2.1 (4) 3.2 (3) 2.4 (7) 
Supervisory Violations 0.0 (0) 1.1 (1) 0.3 (1) 
PRECONDITIONS OF UNSAFE ACTS 106.9 (308) 
Environmental Factors 
Physical 21.8 (42) 14.7 (14) 19.4(56) 
Technological 18.1 (35) 21.1 (20) 19.1 (55) 
Personnel Factors 
Crew Resource Management 23.8 (46) 10.5 (10) 19.4 (56) 
Personal Readiness 34.2 (66) 37.9 (36) 35.4 (102) 
Conditions of Operators 
Adverse Mental States 11.4 (22) 6.3 (6) 9.7 (28) 
Adverse Physiological States 4.7 (9) 1.1 (1) 3.5 (10) 
Physical/Mental Limitations 0.5 (1) 0.0 (0) 0.3 (1) 
UNSAFE ACTS OF OPERA TORS 99.3 (286) 
Errors 
Skill-based 43.5 (84) 69.5 (66) 52.1 (150) 
Decision-based 36.3 (70) 22.1 (21) 31.6(91) 
Perceptual-based 16.6 (32) 8.4 (8) 13.9 (40) 
Violations 
Routine 1.0 (2) 1 .1 (1) 1.0 (3) 
Exceptional 0.5 (1) 1.1 (1) 0.7 (2) 
Note: Percentages may exceed 100% as multiple classifications were made in some incidents. 
HFACS Level 4: Organisational Factors. Overall, organisational factors were 
cited as contributory in 29.9% of the incidents. As expected this is somewhat less than 
the other levels of HF ACS, because by this level human contributory factors are on the 
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larger scale and not as specific or salient as say, selecting the wrong button. When 
organisational factors were reported as present, it was generally as 'organisational 
process' errors (13.2%) and failures in 'resource acquisition/management' (10.8%). 
Rotary-wing incidents showed marginally more occurrences of factors at this level of 
the framework ('resource acquisition/management' 11.6% versus 10.4% for fixed-wing; 
'organisational climate' 6.3% versus 5.7% for fixed-wing; and 'organisational process' 
14.7% versus 12.4% for fixed-wing). These differences were marginal because the 
differences between the two aircraft types are not as salient at this level. That is, at this 
level it is the organisation as opposed to the individual and the organisation 
encompasses both aircraft types. Comparisons at this level yielded no significant 
differences. 
HFACS Level 3: Unsafe Supervision. Citations of unsafe supervisory factors 
occurred in over a third of all incidents (3 7.2% ). This is more frequent than that of the 
level 4 factors as might be expected. The majority of failures at the level of Unsafe 
Supervision were categorised as 'inadequate supervision' (25%). 'Planned inappropriate 
operations', which includes the management and assignment of work, was the next most 
frequently cited factor at this level (9.4%). Very little difference was found between 
fixed-wing and rotary-wing incidents at this level. Again, these findings were not 
statistically significant. 
HF ACS Level 2: Preconditions of Unsafe Acts. Taken as a whole, there were 
308 (106.9%) instances of Preconditions ofUnsafe Acts reported. The large percentage 
was a result of some reports containing more than one precondition. 
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Environmental Factors. Predictably, environmental factors such as operational 
setting and equipment design were regularly reported as contributory. Interestingly, 
'physical environment' factors (which included elements like weather, altitude, heat, 
and vibration) were mentioned more frequently in fixed-wing aircraft incidents (21.8%) 
than in rotary-wing aircraft incidents (14.7%). Conversely, 'technological environment' 
factors (which included design of controls, interface characteristics, and automation) 
were more commonly associated with rotary-wing aircraft (21.1%) than fixed-wing 
(18.1 %). These differences were not statistically significant. 
Personnel Factors. Personnel factors were also frequently identified within the 
narratives. 'Crew resource management' issues were present in 19.4% of incidents, and 
'personal readiness' was the most cited Precondition of Unsafe Acts (35.4%). Of note, 
'CRM' factors were reported considerably more frequently with fixed-wing aircraft 
crew (23.8%) than rotary-wing (10.5%). This may be a result of the crew of a fixed-
wing aircraft typically comprising a navigator and flight engineer, in addition to the 
pilot and co-pilot, in military aviation. 'Personal readiness' factors were only slightly 
more frequently associated with rotary-wing aircraft (37.9%) than fixed-wing (34.2%). 
The differences between these personnel factors and fixed- versus rotary- wing aircrew 
were significant x2 (4.55,1, p = .033). That is, using chi-square analysis, it was found 
that aircrew of fixed-wing aircraft had proportionately more 'CRM' breakdowns than 
rotary-wing crew, and proportionately less 'personal readiness' failures. 
Conditions of Operators. Although not as common, condition of operators was 
cited as a contributory factor in as many as 39 incidents. The most frequently mentioned 
condition of the operators was 'adverse mental states' (9.7%). Fixed-wing incidents had 
almost twice as many citations of 'adverse mental states' (11.4% compared to 6.3% 
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rotary-wing incidents) and four times as many references to 'adverse physiological 
states' ( 4. 7% to 1.1 %, respectively). These differences were not statistically significant. 
HF ACS Level I: Unsafe Acts of Operators. As has been found in other studies 
(Lenne, Ashby, & Fitzharris, 2008; Shappell, Detwiler, Holcomb, Hackworth, Boquet 
& Wiegmann, 2007; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001), the 
majority of the contributory factors to the incidents were established at the level of 
Unsafe Acts of Operators. Overall, 99.3% of the incident narratives reported an unsafe 
act committed by the operator. The percentages of occurrence for each type of error 
were substantial in comparison to the other HF ACS categories. Indeed, 52.1% of the 
narratives were cited as being associated with 'skill-based errors' and 31.6% with 
'decision-based errors', as categorised by the HF ACS framework. Somewhat fewer 
incidents involved 'perceptual-based errors' (13.9%). Conversely, both 'routine 
violations' (1 %) and 'exceptional violations' (0.7%) were rarely cited. This lack of 
findings involving violations may be because most of the narratives provided too little 
detail necessary to be able to make a distinction between the types (Lenne et al., 2008). 
Incidents involving rotary-wing aircraft were reported as highly likely to have a 
'skill-based error' (69.5%). While fixed-wing incidents were also reportedly more likely 
to involve a 'skill-based error' (43.5%) than other error type, rotary-wing incidents were 
59.8% more likely to incur a failure associated with skill. 'Decision-based errors' were 
cited as less likely to be associated with an incident. However, when this factor was 
implicated it was typically more so in fixed-wing (36.3%) than rotary-wing (22.1%). 
That is, 36.3% of fixed-wing errors at this level of HF ACS were decision errors. Errors 
that were perceptually-based were cited more often in fixed-wing incidents (16.6%) 
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compared to rotary-wing (8.4%). A Chi-square analysis was applied to the error 
proportions obtained for fixed- and rotary-wing incidents. It was found that rotary-wing 
aircraft incidents involved proportionally more 'skill-based errors' than fixed-wing 
aircraft incidents, and proportionally less 'decision-based' and 'perceptual-based 
errors', x2(12.1, 2,p = .002). 
HF A CS Framework Analysis 
To examine associations between the adjacent levels of HF ACS, the data were 
cross-tabulated using SPSS. As can be seen in Figure 9, there were a number of 
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Figure 9. Pathways illustrating significant associations using chi-square (X2) and Lambda (A.) between the 
categories of the four levels ofHFACS. 
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Chi-square Association Analyses. Chi-square ('x.2) assessments to test the null 
hypothesis that categories between the four levels of the framework were independent, 
without indicating the strength or direction of the possible relationships, were 
performed (Li et al., 2008). Specifically, the associations between level 4 and level 3, 
level 3 and level 2, and level 2 and level 1 were investigated using Chi-square. Analyses 
of the relationships between downward adjacent levels of HF ACS showed six 
statistically significant chi-square associations (p < .05) as shown in Table 6. Between 
level 4 and level 3, 'organisational climate' was significantly associated with 'planned 
inappropriate operations' x:2(8.537, 1,p < .05). Between level3 and level2, 'inadequate 
supervision' was significantly associated with both 'personal readiness' x:2(1.702, 1,p < 
.05) and 'crew resource management' x:2(4.256, 1, p < .05). The level 2 category of 
'personal readiness' was associated significantly with the level 1 classification of 'skill-
based error' x:2(7.194, 1, p < .05). Finally, the level 2 category 'physical environment' 
was found to be significantly associated with both 'skill-based' x:2(4.526, 1, p < .05) 
and 'perceptual-based' x:2(5.055, 1, p < .05) errors. 
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Table 6. Significant Chi-square tests of Association and associated values for Goodman and Kruskal 's 
Lambda with Corresponding Odds Ratios for Upper Level and Adjacent Downward Level Categories in 
the HFACS Framework 
Significant associations between upper levels and adjacent Chi Square Lambda Odds 
lower level classifications ofthe HFACS Framework Value pValue 
Ratio 
HFACS Level4 association with Level3 classifications 
Organisational Climate x Planned Inappropriate Operations 8.537 .003 4.716 
HFACS Level3 associations with Level2 classifications 
Inadequate Supervision x Personal Readiness 1.702 .000 .078 3.105 
Inadequate Supervision x Crew Resource Management 4.256 .039 1.923 
Failed to Correct a Known Problem x Technological Environment .091 28.408 
HFACS Level2 associations with Levell classifications 
Physical Environment x Skill-based Errors 4.562 .033 .087 0.526 
Physical Environment x Perceptual-based Errors 5.055 .025 2.295 
Adverse Mental States x Skill-based Errors .029 0.663 
Adverse Physiological States x Skill-based Errors .014 0.603 
Crew Resource Management x Skill-based Errors .029 0.755 
Personal Readiness x Skill-based Errors 7.194 .007 .101 1.958 
All tests have 1 degree of freedom. All other comparisons were non-significant. 
Lambda Value and Subsequent Odds Ratio Analyses. Supplementing the above 
analyses was Goodman and Kruskal's Lambda (A.), which evaluates the proportional 
reduction in error (PRE) in predicting the potential dependence of lower levels on 
adjoining higher levels (Li et al., 2008). The proportional reduction in error essentially 
reflects the ability to predict the prevalence of a lower level factor occurring from a 
higher-level factor (Li & Harris, 2006). The lambda value obtained using categorical 
data represents the PRE. For interpretive purposes, the established criteria to be taken as 
a significant association will be values in excess of 0% but not over 5%, as well as 
values in excess of 5% (Li & Harris, 2006). Lastly, to afford an approximation of the 
likelihood of a dependence of a lower HF ACS level factor on a higher level factor's 
presence, odds ratios were calculated (Li et al., 2008). As odds ratios are an asymmetric 
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measure, they were only calculated in conjunction with non-zero lambda values or 
significant Chi-square values to ensure a meaningful finding (Li et al., 2008). 
Associations Between HFACS Levels 4 and 3. Calculation of the Lambda 
statistic revealed no significant associations between levels 4 and 3. Therefore, due to 
the fact that they are only theoretically meaningful when associated with significant 
statistics, odds ratios were not calculated for values between these levels. It should be 
reiterated here that a significant Chi-square association was found between 
'organisational climate' and 'planned inappropriate operations' (p < .05). There were, 
however, several significant lambda values between both levels 3 and 2, and levels 2 
and 1. 
Associations Between HFACS Levels 3 and 2. HFACS Level 3 (Unsafe 
Supervision) factors that were demonstrated to directly influence HF ACS Level 2 
(Preconditions of Unsafe Acts) factors, with a lambda value in excess of 5%, included 
'inadequate supervision' with 'personal readiness' (A = .078) and 'failed to correct a 
known problem' with 'technological environment' (A= .091). The odds ratios show that 
'personal readiness' was 3.11 times more likely to be a factor in an incident narrative 
when there was a lack in adequate supervision, and that a 'failure to correct a known 
problem' was 28.41 times more likely to be associated with failures in the 
'technological environment'. 
Associations Between HFACS Levels 2 and 1. HFACS Preconditions of Unsafe 
Acts (level 2) associated with HF ACS Unsafe Acts of Operators (level 1) were 
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'personal readiness' and 'physical environment' with 'skill-based errors' (with a lambda 
value in excess of 5%), and 'adverse mental states', 'adverse physiological states', and 
'crew resource management' with 'skill-based errors' (with a lambda value in excess of 
0%, but not over 5%). Odds Ratios indicated that deficient performances in the second 
level categories of HF ACS were up to 2.5 times more likely to be associated with 
problems in the first level categories of HF ACS. These statistical relationships, in 
addition to significant chi-square values, are illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 9, 
and summarized in Table 6. 
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General Discussion 
The purpose of the present study was to retrospectively explore the relationship 
between human error and aviation incidents using HF ACS and the Cognitive Error 
Taxonomy. Firstly, HF ACS will be discussed in terms of its findings in relation to other 
research as well as the methodological issues raised during the analysis. HF ACS will 
then be assessed against the evaluative criteria outlined in the introduction. Second, the 
findings of the Cognitive Error Taxonomy will be evaluated and compared to other 
research using the taxonomy. A fixed-wing versus rotary-wing analysis, performance 
shaping factors analysis and a phase of flight analysis will follow this. The conclusions 
drawn from the findings will be used to discuss the applicability, practical and 
theoretical implications of both HF ACS and the Cognitive Error Taxonomy. Finally, 
future directions for classification systems will be proposed. 
In terms of the human error differences between fixed-wing and rotary-wing 
aircraft, there were a number of statistically significant findings. Analysis of the 
taxonomy showed that pilots of rotary-wing aircraft were more likely than fixed-wing 
aircraft pilots to commit action errors. Errors in fixed-wing aircraft were more likely to 
occur during the take-off phase of flight. Analysis of HF ACS results produced 
proportionally more 'skill-based' errors in rotary-wing than fixed-wing incidents. The 
relational analysis using the Lambda statistic found that 'skill-based' errors were the 
most influenced by the Preconditions of Unsafe Acts. In addition, 'inadequate 
supervision' was the higher level factor that most influenced Preconditions of Unsafe 
Acts. A more in-depth analysis and discussion of both classification systems will 
follow. 
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Many argue that the current high level of safety within aviation should not 
obscure the fact that when an accident does transpire it is frequently preventable 
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2005). Classification systems have been developed to provide a 
means to analyse and subsequently interpret human error. The primary objectives of the 
current study were twofold. Firstly, to statistically and taxonomically examine the 
human error present in a database sample obtained from an Australasian military 
organisation. Secondly, to investigate the presence of relationships between those errors 
established by the application of HF ACS. In a basic sense, the results showed that while 
errors appear to be unique at first glance, HF ACS and the taxonomy applied here can 
successfully organize the reports based upon underlying cognitive mechanisms. In 
addition, HF ACS was able to elucidate environmental, personal, supervisory, and 
organisational factors relevant to the cause of that error. 
Previous research using HF ACS and the Cognitive Error Taxonomy allows us 
the opportunity to compare military aviation incidents with civilian aviation incidents. 
As can be seen in Table 7, the present analysis can be compared with commercial, 
general, and other military aviation studies using HF ACS. Figure 10 represents the 
differences between civil and military aviation for the Cognitive Error Taxonomy. The 
following sections of the discussion will outline the differences as well as the 
similarities between commercial, general, and military aviation. 
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Table 7. Percentages ofHFACS Categories for the Present Analysis, a Commercial Aviation Study, a 
General Aviation Study, and a Military Aviation Study. 
HFACSCATEGORY %(N) 
COMMERCIAL GENERAL MILITARY 
Present Shappell et al Lenne, Li& Harris 
Analysis (2007) Ashby,& (2005) 
Fitzharris 
(2008) 
ORGANISATIONAL INFLUENCES 29.9 (86) 52.9 (54) 7.1 (12) 50.5 (264) 
Resource Acquisition/Management 10.8 (31) 4.9 (50) 3.5 (6) 35.2 (184) 
Organisational Climate 5.9 (17) 0.4 (4) 0 (0.0) 0.8 (4) 
Organisational Process 13.2 (38) 0.4 (4) 3.5 (6) 14.5 (76) 
UNSAFE SUPERVISION 37.2 (107) 4.5 (46) 14.8 (25) 42.3 (221) 
Inadequate Supervision 25.0 (72) 3.5 (36) 6.5 (11) 33.8 (177) 
Planned Inappropriate Operations 9.4 (27) 0.8 (8) 1.8 (3) 4.6 (24) 
Failure to Correct a Known Problem 2.4 (7) 0 (0.0) 2.9 (5) 2.3 (12) 
Supervisory Violations 0.3 (1) 0.2 (2) 3.5 (6) 1.5 (8) 
PRECONDITIONS OF UNSAFE 106.9 (308) 81.8 (834) 94.7 (160) 105.5 (552) 
ACTS 
Environmental Factors 
Physical 19.4 (56) 58.0 (592) 21.9 (37) 14.1 (74) 
Technological 19.1 (55) 1.5 (15) 1.8 (3) 8.4 (44) 
Personnel Factors 
Crew Resource Management 19.4 (56) 10.7 (109) 5.3 (9) 27.9 (146) 
Personal Readiness 35.4 (102) 0.3 (3) 12.4(21) 5.5 (29) 
Conditions of Operators 
Adverse Mental States 9.7 (28) 6.5 (66) 32.5 (55) 35.2 (184) 
Adverse Physiological States 3.5 (10) 2.4 (24) 1.8 (3) 0.4 (2) 
Physical/Mental Limitations 0.3 (1) 4.4 (45) 18.9 (32) 14.0 (73) 
UNSAFE ACTS OF OPERA TORS 99.3 (286) 122.7 (1252) 69.2 (117) 138.6 (725) 
Errors 
Skill-based 52.1 (150) 56.5 (576) 60.9 (103) 43.2 (226) 
Decision-based 31.6 (91) 36.7 (374) 35.5 (60) 42.6 (223) 
Perceptual-based 13.9 (40) 6.5 (66) 16.0 (27) 22.2 (116) 
Violations 
Routine 1.0 (3) 23.1 (236) 16 (27) 30.6 (160) 
Exceptional 0.7 (2) (Combined) (Combined) (Combined) 
Note: Percentages may exceed 100% as multiple classifications were made in some incidents. 
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HF ACS Analysis 
Organisational Influences. Reason (1990) postulated that latent conditions 
encouraging unsafe behaviors are inherently prevalent in all human-influenced systems. 
Wiegmann and Shappell (1997) adapted this theory into HFACS. The following figures 
were obtained from the current analysis. Organisational Influences were cited in 86 
(29.9%) of the narratives contained in the sample. 'Organisational process' had the 
highest number of citations within the narratives at 38 (13.2%), followed by 'resource 
acquisition/management', which was reported in 31 instances (10.8%). 'Organisational 
climate', on the other hand, was found in only 17 reports (5.9%). However, 
'organisational climate' was shown to have a significant association with the level 3 
category of 'planned inappropriate operations'. That is, according to the findings of the 
present study, an organisation lacking in an appropriate safety culture will be associated 
with poor operational planning by managerial staff. Moreover, Li and Harris (2006) 
have found related associations between HFACS levels 4 and 3. The commonality 
between the above fmdings suggests that the inclusion of these latent conditions within 
HF ACS appears to have merit as they are contributing to human error. 
Interestingly, even within the military sector, Tvaryanas, Thompson, and 
Constable (2006) demonstrated markedly different organisational factor frequency 
across United States Army (approximately 50% of total mishaps were contributed to by 
Organisational Influences), Air Force (over 60%) and Navy/Marines (under 30%). This 
is surprising because HF ACS was originally evolved specifically for military use 
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 1996; 1997; 1999; Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997). 
HF ACS research in commercial aviation has found similar prevalence and 
significant associations of level four factors to that found in military aviation. A study 
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using the lambda measure of association to understand relationships between HF ACS 
levels has shown 'organisational process' to be significantly associated with all four 
categories of Unsafe Supervision (Li et al., 2008). 'Resource management' also 
demonstrated strong associations with Unsafe Supervision. In contrast, general aviation 
studies utilizing HF ACS have shown a different pattern. Lenne et al. (2008) found the 
presence of organisational factors in 169 general aviation crashes to be extremely 
limited. In fact, 'organisational process' and 'resource management' factors were only 
cited six times each, whereas 'organisational climate' was not cited at all. The 
difference between the domains of aviation is evident at this level of HF ACS. 
Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) proposed that the definitive lack in organisational factor 
frequency apparent in general aviation studies is the result of most crashes in that 
particular sector being owner-operated and thus these factors are redundant. That is, as 
the individual piloting them often owns aircraft operated in the general aviation sector, 
the organisational hierarchy is not present because the pilot cannot represent both the 
frontline operator and the organisation. 
The divergence in the prevalence of organisational factors between general 
aviation and commercial and military aviation may be due to several conceivable 
explanations. Firstly, definitions of each aviation sector may differ across studies. To 
actively compare studies it is imperative to have first aligned the database used in each 
study with the most appropriate domain of aviation. Secondly, the disparities may be a 
result of failing to distinguish between data collected from accidents and data collected 
from incidents. As will be discussed later, a number of analyses have discovered human 
errors committed in accidents differ markedly from those errors committed in incidents 
(O'Hare et al., 1994; O'Hare, 2006). Thirdly, and perhaps most concerning, is the 
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possibility of differences in the quality of existing human factors databases. The 
necessity for a standardized structure for data collection is fairly well established within 
the aviation community. Attempting to compare data garnered from wholly separate 
sources - for example, Lenne et al. (2008) analysed insurance reports of general 
aviation incidents, whereas Shappell et al. (2007) analysed commercial aviation 
accident data obtained from the National Transportation Safety Board - may give a 
misrepresentation of the actual differences. Care must be taken in interpreting the 
differences presented between the three sectors of aviation, and it should be noted that 
the differences reported here are by no means absolute. 
Unsafe Supervision. Factors involving Unsafe Supervision were reported in 
3 7.2% of all aircrew related incidents. The most frequently reported factor was found to 
be 'inadequate supervision' with 72 instances (25%). It should be reiterated here that 
the present analysis was completed using incident reports from an Australasian military 
database. The high overall frequency of supervisory factors supports the assumption 
that a military organisation has well defined management roles with clearly outlined 
responsibilities. In contrast, Gaur (2005) emphasized the difficulties researchers 
encounter in identifYing supervisors in commercial aviation. Following on from this 
proposition, Gaur (2005) reported Unsafe Supervision contributed to 25% of accidents 
in his study involving commercial carriers. However, it should be noted here that Gaur's 
(2005) study had a very small sample size and as a result, the proportion may be 
difficult to generalize. The commercial aviation data collected by Shappell et al. (2007) 
had a more salient finding in support of the above results with only 46 instances ( 4.5% 
overall) of Unsafe Supervision. 
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A significant relationship was found between 'inadequate supervision' and 
'crew resource management (CRM)' in the current analysis. Li and Harris (2006) 
established a similar association between level 3 'inadequate supervision' and level 2 
'CRM' in their study involving accidents in the Republic of China Air Force. Li et al. 
(2008) determined this association again using commercial aviation accident data. 
'CRM' comprises communication and leadership issues, and 'inadequate supervision' 
refers to the failure to provide adequate training, accountability, and incentives. Not 
surprisingly, failures at one level are influenced by failures at the other level. 
· The present analysis also showed significant associations between 'inadequate 
supervision' and the level 2 category 'personal readiness', again demonstrating that a 
loss of supervisory situational awareness can result in detrimental preconditions. 
'Failure to correct a known problem' was significantly associated with the Precondition 
of Unsafe Act in 'technological environment'. This association makes sense in that 
uncorrected design inadequacies will continue to be contributory in aircraft mishaps. 
One question worth considering given the underwhelming percentage of 
supervisory factors reported is whether or not there is an inherent bias which 
predisposes the investigators to concentrate on the aircrew error? And as a result, are 
issues associated with management and higher-level entities getting the attention 
necessary to invoke change? The answers to these questions are complex, and will be 
discussed throughout the practical and theoretical implication sections. 
Preconditions of Unsafe Acts. Overall, 308 Preconditions of Unsafe Acts were 
cited in the incidents analysed. Of the seven factors of Preconditions of Unsafe Acts, 
only two were cited ten or less times in the accident narratives - 'Adverse physiological 
states' (3.5%) and 'physical/mental limitations' (0.3%). Preconditions of Unsafe Acts 
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can be divided into three subsets encompassmg environmental factors, personnel 
factors, and substandard conditions of operators. 
Environmental factors were reported in 38.5% of the incidents in the current 
study, evenly distributed between 'physical' and 'technological' factors. In contrast, in 
Shappell et al.'s (2007) examination of commercial aviation accidents, 'physical 
environment' was by far the most cited precondition (58%). Furthermore, Kinnersley 
and Roelen (2007) demonstrated that inadequate design ('technological environment') 
in aviation and nuclear industries is a causative factor in approximately 50% of 
mishaps. 
With regard to personnel factors, 'CRM' was cited in 19.4% of all analysed 
incidents. This finding was somewhat similar to Wiegmann and Shappell' s (200 1) study 
of commercial aviation crashes that found 'CRM' contributed to 29.4% of all aircrew 
related errors. In contrast, Gaur (2005) found 'CRM' contributory in only 12.5% of 
commercial accidents. However, he argued that his finding might be unrepresentative 
because only half of the accidents analysed had two or more pilots crewing the aircraft. 
'Personal readiness' was the most frequently reported precondition (35.4%). As 
mentioned in the introduction, 'personal readiness' includes inadequate training. The 
fact that there was a statistically significant association found between 'personal 
readiness' and 'skill-based errors' may be reflective of this lack of adequate training. 
This will be considered in more depth in the following section. 
Finally, conditions of operators were the least cited aspect of HF ACS level 2. 
This is a completely opposite finding to a commercial aviation accident analysis by 
Gaur (2005) who found 43.8% of accidents had poor conditions of operators. Of these, 
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the most common factor was 'physical/mental limitations' (31.3%), a factor that was 
only cited once in the present analysis. 
Reason (1990) hypothesized a 'many-to-one' mapping of psychological and 
situational preconditions that may contribute to an unsafe act of a frontline operator. 
The current research goes some way in supporting this assertion, as do a number of 
other studies (Gaur, 2005; Lenne et al., 2008; Li & Harris, 2006; Li et al., 2008; 
Shappell et al., 2007; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2005). It must be noted here that caution 
should be exercised in interpreting associations (Li & Harris, 2006). Specifically, it is 
difficult to consistently predict which aircrew errors will occur as a consequence of a 
precondition occurring concomitantly. The statistical lambda value analysis performed 
here goes some way to elucidating this, and will be outlined in the following sections. 
Briefly, all but two factors of HF ACS Preconditions of Unsafe Acts' ('technical 
environment' and 'physical/mental limitations') were statistically associated with an 
Unsafe Act of Operator. 
Unsafe Acts of Operators. 'Skill-based errors' were by far the most frequent 
HF ACS level 1 category reported in the present analysis with just over half ( 52.1%) of 
the incidents coded being associated with at least one 'skill-based error'. Previous 
research has shown 'skill-based errors' to be predominant across all three aviation 
domains (Gaur, 2005; Lenne et al., 2008; Shappell et al., 2007; Shappell & Wiegmann, 
2005; Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997). 
In the current analysis using lambda to ascertain the existence of relationships 
between higher levels ofHFACS and the adjacent lower levels, several Preconditions of 
Unsafe Acts were shown to be markedly associated with 'skill-based errors'. In 
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particular, 'personal readiness' and 'physical environment' showed a relatively strong 
(lambda value in excess of 5%) relationship with the level 1 category of 'skill-based 
errors'. 'Adverse mental states', 'adverse physiological states', and 'CRM' were also 
statistically associated with 'skill-based errors'. A study involving military accidents (Li 
& Harris, 2006) reported significant lambda associations between three categories of 
HF ACS level 2 ('physical/mental limitations', 'CRM', and 'personal readiness') and 
'skill-based errors'. 
Conversely, a study in commercial aviation (Li et al., 2008) only reported a few 
categories significantly associated with 'skill-based errors', one being 'CRM'. Other 
studies from each aviation sector (Lenne et al., 2008; Li & Harris, 2006; Li et al., 2008) 
have reported similar associations between 'adverse mental states' and 'skill-based 
errors' to those found in the present study. 
So, how are 'skill-based errors' committed? Traditionally, 'skill-based errors' 
are attributed to failures of attention and/or inaccuracy of fine motor execution 
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2005). If a pilot is distracted from the task at hand- in this 
case, flying an aircraft - his/her ability to competently monitor the critical flight 
parameters is compromised which could potentially result in an adverse safety event 
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2005). Once a skilled behaviour is acquired, it is preserved 
through experience and training. Therefore, 'skill-based errors' are likely to transpire 
during highly repetitive, routine actions that require little conscious thought according 
to models proposed by Reason (1990) and Rasmussen (1982). Gaur (2005) proposed 
that given that skill-based behaviours are maintained by experience and practice, the 
elevated pervasiveness of 'skill-based errors' demonstrated in general aviation might be 
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a product of the lack of continual training and limited flying time general aviation pilots 
usually fly compared to commercial and military aviators. 
The logical step from here is determining how to prevent 'skill-based errors' 
from happening. In terms of personnel, it seems it would be beneficial to increase 
operational training as well as enhance critical event experience thereby improving the 
pilot's proficiency (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2005). Baysari et al. (2008) suggest 
modifying design features to create a particularly error-tolerant system with increased 
warning functions will be helpful as well. The above, in addition to more extensive 
checklists and automation, have yet to be determined as effective interventions in a real 
aviation environment. 
'Decision-based errors' were found to be associated with 31.6% of the incidents 
analysed in the present study. Again, this reflects the findings of previous research. 
Studies applying HF ACS to general aviation have reported an average prevalence of 
'decision-based errors' of just over a third of accidents and incidents analysed (Lenne et 
al., 2008; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2005). Similarly, 
'decision-based errors' (as delineated by HFACS) have been cited on average in slightly 
less than 30% of commercial aviation mishaps (Gaur, 2005; Shappell et al., 2007). The 
present study involved military aviation incidents. 
Despite the lack of statistically significant evidence of associations between 
HFACS level2 Preconditions ofUnsafe Acts and 'decision-based errors' in the current 
analysis, other studies have reported significant relationships. In the first known 
analysis using lambda in conjunction with HF ACS, Li and Harris (2006) found the level 
2 categories of 'adverse mental states', physical/mental limitation', 'CRM', and 
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'personal readiness' to be significantly associated with 'decision-based errors' in 
military aviation. It is sensible to assume these categories affect a pilot's ability to make 
a sound decision while flying. Similar correlations were reported by Li et al. (2008), this 
time in an analysis involving commercial aviation accident data. Both 'adverse mental 
states' and 'CRM' were shown to detrimentally affect decision-making by aircrew. 
Finally, a study including data from general aviation found associations between 'skill-
based errors' and the level 2 factors 'physical/mental limitations', 'adverse mental 
states', and 'personal readiness'. 
'Decision-based errors' are intentional behaviours inappropriate for the 
situation. They occur as the result of an unrecognized or misdiagnosed state to which 
the pilot employs an unsuitable strategy or procedure. Shappell and Wiegmann (2005) 
found 'decision-based errors' in general aviation typically involved planning and 
weather-evaluation issues. Therefore it may be prudent to infer that general aviation 
accidents have the most prevalent frequency of decision errors because of their lack of 
information about weather patterns and the like. 
Historically, methods to reduce 'decision-based errors' have been presented as 
isolated decision-making seminars and modulated training (Shappell & Wiegmann, 
2005). As the aviation safety community expands its knowledge, more up-to-date 
training techniques are being introduced such as 'scenario-based exercises'. This 
approach incorporates a real world operational context within decision-making tasks, 
and has been demonstrated to improve decision-making (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2005). 
In addition, flight simulators have also provided a means of improving decision-making 
in pilots (O'Hare et al., 1994). 
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'Perceptual enors' contributed to the least number of incidents analysed in the 
cunent study (13.9%) compared to 'skill-based' and 'decision-based enors'. The 
prevalence of 'perceptual enors' has had varied consistency across studies in general 
aviation from 5.7% (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2005) to 16% (Lenne et al., 2008). The 
same is true for 'perceptual enors' in commercial aviation, from 6.5% (Shappell et al., 
2007) to 14.6% (Gaur, 2005). These diverse, yet relatively low, frequencies suggest two 
possibilities: the first is that potentially the strategies implemented to increase 
awareness of perceptual failures and their consequences have been successful; and the 
second refers to the possibility that the ability of HF ACS to define, and therefore 
implicate, perceptual failures is lacking. 
Techniques that have been utilized to reduce the occurrence of perceptual 
failures included devising new and improved warning systems, such as ground collision 
avoidance systems, as well as increasing awareness of visual/aural illusions (Shappell et 
al., 2007). The low prevalence of 'perceptual enors' gives us reason to believe that 
these efforts have been effective (Li & Hanis, 2006). One should be cautious, however, 
when interpreting these findings because a low prevalence of a factor could also denote 
an unreliable definition, which brings the practicality of HF ACS into question. 
'Perceptual-based enors' occur when a pilot's observation of the world differs 
from reality (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Examples include visual illusions, spatial 
disorientation, distance and altitude misjudgements, and aural misperception. One 
would expect 'perceptual enors' to be reported as contributory more frequently in the 
dynamic environment (for example, tactical, aerobatical, and night exercises) of military 
aircraft (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2005). However, as mentioned earlier, the current 
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analysis involving military incidents produced a percentage similar to the frequencies 
reported in both general and commercial aviation. 
The current research showed that violations were associated with less than 2% 
of the aviation incidents reported in the database. 'Routine violations' accounted for 1% 
of all incidents, and 'exceptional violations' were contributory to only 0.7% of 
incidents. In the case of general and commercial aviation, Shappell and Wiegmann 
(2005) report a contributory percentage of 14% of general aviation, and Shappell et al. 
(2007) found 23.1% were associated with violations. Violations are defined in HF ACS 
as 'the willful disregard for the rules and regulations that govern the safety of flight' 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003, p.55). 'Exceptional violations' are not endorsed by 
management, whereas 'routine violations' are often tolerated. A high prevalence of 
violations suggests a less than credible safety culture. It could be argued that the 
extremely low prevalence of violations reported as contributory in this study reflect the 
discipline and rule enforcement of a military organisation. However, Shappell et al. 
(1999) found percentages of violations ranging from 35% (U.S. Navy/Marine Corp) to 
27% (U.S. Army) to as low as 7% (U.S. Air Force). Further investigation is warranted 
here. 
Although no statistically significant associations were established between 
HFACS level2 Preconditions ofUnsafe Acts and level1 violations in the present study, 
it should be noted that Li et al. (2008) found a significant association between the level 
2 category of 'CRM' and the violations category oflevel 1. This association reflects the 
findings of O'Hare and Smitheram (1995) that social pressure is a factor in the 
conscious choice to continue flight into adverse weather despite safety rules - a clear 
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violation. In addition, Lenne et al. (2008) found an association between the level 2 
factor 'adverse mental states' and violations in their study involving general aviation 
incidents. The lack of a statistically significant association in the current study is most 
likely due to the extremely small proportion of violations reported. 
Shappell and Wiegmann (2003) showed that fatal general aviation accidents 
were at least four times more likely than non-fatal accidents to be associated with 
violations (both 'routine' and 'exceptional'). In addition, it has been found that 
violations in general aviation maintenance (generally owner-operator) were three times 
more likely to involve a fatality than accidents resulting from a 'skill-based error'. 
Shappell et al. (2007) mentioned that some analysts claim that violations and 'decision-
based errors' are essentially accessing the same thing - a conscious judgment. This may 
be demonstrated in that Wiegmann and Shappell's (2003) findings were aligned with 
0' Hare et al.'s (1994) study that demonstrated 'decision-based errors' were more likely 
to be associated with fatal consequences. However, violations are defined as the 
'willful' disregard for the policies in place, and are defined as typically occurring as a 
result of the individual's hazardous attitude, for example overconfidence. Conversely, 
'decision-based errors' are usually a result of a lack of information or knowledge. 
HFACS Methodology and Evaluating Criteria 
For a classification system to generate meaningful and insightful analysis, 
Wiegmann and Shappell (200 1) produced five criteria that practitioners may use as a 
measure of success. As described previously, these five criteria were reliability, 
comprehensiveness, diagnosticity, usability, and validity. Reliability is the extent of 
agreement between raters on the identification of causal factors. Comprehensiveness 
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refers to a classification system's ability to identify all relevant factors of an incident. 
Diagnosticity addresses the 'what' and 'why' of an observed en-or. Usability is the 
extent to which a classification system is relevant and useful in the operational world. In 
a basic sense, validity is the extent to which a classification system measures what it is 
supposed to measure. That is, the extent of accuracy of the inferences made. 
Our individual experiences and biases affect the way we interpret events. 
O'Hare et al. (1994) suggested that the use of multiple raters and the establishment of 
satisfactory levels of inter-rater reliability safeguards against subjective biases. 
Reliability analysis was performed in the cun-ent study. Although a reasonably 
acceptable Cohen's kappa value was obtained for 15 of the 19 HFACS categories, only 
14 test cases were used. Cohen' s kappa can be misleading when the sample size is small 
or agreement is very high. However, percentage agreements represented adequate 
reliability in the present study. Only the 'physical/mental limitations' factor induced 
poor levels of agreement. This may be due to a lack of necessary detail in the incident 
nan-atives. 
A recent study (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003) reported an " ... excellent level of 
agreement" (p.3) of 85% between the pilot-raters employed. That is, of the 34,053 
incidents classified as containing human causal factors, 29,534 were agreed upon by at 
least two of the five recruited pilot-raters. Nonetheless, 4,519 reports resulted in 
disagreement - a low percentage in the scheme of this analysis, but still a considerable 
number. In isolation, this many disagreements post serious doubts on the reliability of 
HFACS. 
O'Connor (2008) reported that the aviation safety officers recruited and 
minimally trained to be raters in his HF ACS analysis were unable to reach acceptable 
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standards of reliability. In contrast, Li et al. (2008) reported an inter-rater reliability 
" ... as good as, or in excess ... " (p.431) of previous HFACS studies. However, despite 
these studies claiming high inter-rater reliability, each has produced markedly different 
results (for example, Gaur, 2005; Li & Harris, 2006; Li et al., 2008; Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 1997) that may be an indication of the possible diversity between working 
definitions of HF ACS categories (Lenne et al., 2008). The fact that several empirical 
analyses conducted by the developers of HF ACS, Doug Wiegmann and Scott Shappell, 
have produced similar findings between them supports this assertion. Wiegmann and 
Shappell's (2003) factor definitions underwent several iterative refinements to develop 
these comparatively reliable classifications. In the present study, in an attempt to 
combat the potential discrepancy of working definitions, HF ACS category descriptions 
were derived primarily from the developers' own meanings outlined in their book 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
The diagnosticity of HF ACS was specifically considered in the present analysis 
by using the lambda statistic to ascertain interrelationships between levels. 
Diagnosticity is defined as the capacity of the HF ACS to allow practitioners to 
understand a mishap sequence in a constructive way. By and large, there is a trade off 
between a system's diagnosticity (typically requiring many categories) and usability 
(typically requiring fewer categories). In addition, this is related to the mutual 
exclusivity of each factor, which is important to maintain. 
The present investigation of HF ACS found that although the number of 
classifications was relatively large, the hierarchical structure increased the usability of 
HF ACS for the coder. O'Connor (2008), while finding limited agreement on causal 
HF ACS categories, reported that reliability was satisfactory in non-contributory codes. 
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A 'non-contributory code' is essentially an HF ACS category that is ruled out as 
contributing to an aircraft incident. HF ACS, in this case, appears to fall short on its goal 
of reliably providing a means of identifying contributory issues. He suggests the cause 
of his results may be the overlapping concepts at the foundation of some of the codes as 
each HF ACS category had a number of descriptive nano-codes (one-word explanations 
of the types of errors accounted for by each category of HF ACS) to presumably 
increase comprehensiveness. This affords confirmation to the previously mentioned 
diagnostic necessity of category mutual exclusivity. 
The amount of time spent training coders can also be reflective of a 
classification system's efficiency and usability. Baysari et al. (2008) argue that to 
ensure raters' confidence in assigning causal HF ACS categories, a meticulous and 
explicit formal training program is needed. Such a program would increase the usability 
of HF ACS if it were intensive but short. Three hours training in isolation was 
completed using the HF ACS framework in the current investigation. However, there 
were a number of stages of HF ACS definition research before the training began. 
Comparatively, other studies have utilized a substantially greater amount of time. For 
example, Li and Harris (2006) provided 10 hours of training, whereas Shappell et al. 
(2007) trained their raters for 16 hours. The question is whether this amount of training 
time is necessary? Acceptable levels of reliability were obtained in the current analysis 
with just three hours of self-training, in addition to a number of stages of research. On 
this basis, HF ACS as a practical tool has high usability. 
Comprehensiveness is supported in the applicability of each HF ACS factor. 
Comprehensiveness is whether or not a classification system captures all factors 
contributing to an accident (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001). As will be discussed later, 
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the present study found that each of the 19 categories was cited at least once, which is 
reflective of the comprehensiveness of HF ACS. Lenne et al. (2008) found only a few 
error types unclassified in their general aviation data, which also provides evidence to 
support the comprehensiveness of HF ACS. Despite these conclusions, HF ACS does not 
capture the extent to which each factor contributes to an incident. A factor may be 
marked as present or absent only, regardless of its causal or peripheral nature to the 
error. Some may argue this limits the comprehensiveness of HF ACS in that the 
relevance of factors is ambiguous. 
Essentially, HF ACS diagnosticity, comprehensiveness, reliability, and usability 
were well represented and supported here in that the system has been shown as not 
" ... so small that it provides insufficient information, [or] so big that it is unwieldy [with] 
low levels of reliability" (O'Connor, 2008, p. 604). Validity is reflected in each of the 
four above-mentioned elements. 
The considerable disadvantages inherent in analyzing incident narratives should 
also be mentioned (Tvaryanas et al. 2006). Often incident reports can be unclear, 
confusing, and full of domain-specific knowledge. Poorly structured reports can contain 
too little relevant information, or information that is too complex or abbreviated to 
understand. The application of HF ACS to such a database would be futile. HF ACS 
relies on an abundance of information, covering not only aircrew decisions and actions 
but also supervisory and organisational aspects of an incident. 
The database utilized in this study was acquired from a military organisation in 
Australasia. While each incident report was very well structured, often there were 
missing data values. Descriptions were extremely technical. However, a number of 
safety officers, and engineers contributed to the detail, which allowed for a range of 
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areas relevant to the incident to be well covered aiding HF ACS classification. In 
addition, reporting incidents within the database was voluntary. This may be why the 
present study found such low instances of violations, because of the sensitive nature of 
the issue. Finally, it should also be noted that the reports are often submitted to the 
database days, or even weeks, after the incident occurred subjecting the narratives to 
possible memory biases. 
Cognitive Error Taxonomy Analysis 
The six classifications of the cognitive error taxonomy were able to account for 
281 (97.6%) of the 288 incidents. The high percentage reported in the present study is 
reflective of previous research conducted within the flight domain of military aviation. 
Wiegmann and Shappell (1997) found that the taxonomy classified 91.3% of incidents 
in their sample, as well as 88.5% of an entire database from the United States Navy and 
Marine Corp flight-related mishap database. Nonetheless, this well-established 
applicability of the cognitive error taxonomy does not appear to extend to include 
civilian aviation - that is, commercial and general aviation combined. O'Hare et al 
(1994) showed that only 70% of civilian aviation accident and incident narratives 
obtained from the New Zealand Office of Air Accidents Investigation could be 
classified into one of the six errors of the taxonomy. However, in contrast to the present 
study and Weigmann and Shappell (1997), O'Hare et al. (1994) included 
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Figure 10. Percentages of error type classification at each stage ofthe taxonomy for comparisons between 
three studies. 
Recall that a 'detection error' occurred if a change in flight state from normal to 
non-normal was not recognized. In the present analysis, detection errors accounted for 
10.8% of aircrew error. As can be seen in Figure 10, the other military study reported a 
similar figure of 6.1% detection errors (Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997), whereas the 
civilian aviation analysis reported proportionally more (O'Hare et al., 1994 - 15%; 
O'Hare, 2006 - approximately 27%) than both military studies. This disparity may be a 
result of the different levels in training usually experienced by military pilots versus 
civilian pilots. Potentially, the more a pilot trains the more experienced she/he becomes 
at identifying changes within his/her aircraft and the less likely she/he is to commit a 
detection error. 
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The next element in the cognitive error taxonomy is diagnosis errors. An 
inaccurate assessment of the change in the system state is characterized as a diagnosis 
error, which was the least frequently reported error category (4.9%) in the current study. 
Wiegmann & Shappell ( 1997) reported a much greater frequency of diagnosis errors 
(21.7%), despite also coming from mishaps in a military domain. This may be due to 
the working definitions of each taxonomic category. While the same algorithm was 
used, the accompanying definitions may have been more comprehensive in one study. 
That is, the low frequency of diagnosis errors in the present study could be the result of 
the increased stringency of a more comprehensive definition. Diagnosis errors in 
civilian aviation were shown to be higher than in the present analysis (O'Hare, 2006). 
Again, this may be due to training. That is, the more practiced a pilot becomes at 
diagnosing a system state the less errors in diagnosis he/she commits. 
Goal errors were the second most frequently classified element of the cognitive 
error taxonomy (24.3%) in the current study. A goal error is the failure to select an 
appropriate goal or decision. In contrast, both studies on civilian and military aviation 
accidents/incidents found less frequent levels of goal errors at 15% and 11.6% 
respectively (O'Hare et al., 1994; Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997). Interestingly, goal 
errors have been demonstrated to be the classification most frequently associated with 
serious and/or fatal aircraft accidents (O'Hare et al., 1994; O'Hare, 2006; Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 1997; Zotov, 1997). The pervasiveness of goal errors in serious aircraft 
accidents is indicative of the importance of pilot decision-making training and education 
(O'Hare et al., 1994). 
Unlike errors m goal selection, strategy errors were only classified in 
approximately 6% of the incidents of this study. This low frequency is not reflective of 
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the findings of previous research. O'Hare et al (1994) reported strategy errors as the 
second most frequent error (19%) committed. However, in a later study O'Hare (2006) 
reported a similar figure (approximately 7%) to the present study. 
Of the 288 incidents in the current analysis, 62 (21.5%) were associated with 
procedural error. A procedural error is defmed as a failure in conducting a collection of 
predetermined tasks that are constituents of another more encompassing undertaking 
(O'Hare et al., 1994). This was the second highest error classification of this study, and 
the most frequent in Wiegmann and Shappell's (1997) analysis of military aviation 
accidents. Procedural errors committed within civilian aviation accidents were almost 
double the proportion of the present study (O'Hare et al., 1994). Again, O'Hare (2006) 
found contrasting results in a later study with procedure errors only being cited in 6.2% 
of cases. Additionally, procedural errors have been implicated as more frequent in 
minor incidents as opposed to serious accidents (O'Hare et al., 1994; Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 1997; Zotov, 1997). 
Finally, action errors were the most frequently committed error type (30.2%) as 
classified by the cognitive error taxonomy in the current study. The prevalence of 
incidents involving action error, a failure in the execution of a response, did not 
replicate earlier findings. Wiegmann and Shappell (1997) and O'Hare et al. (1994) both 
reported relatively low instances of action errors (15% and 8.2% respectively) in 
comparison to the frequency found in the present analysis. O'Hare (2006) also reported 
a lower frequency of action errors (11 %). 
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Fixed-wing versus Rotary-wing 
HF A CS. The frequency of HF ACS level 4 Organisational Influence factors for 
fixed and rotary-wing incidents were relatively similar across the board. This was 
expected as fixed and rotary-wing squadrons have the same, or at least an extremely 
similar, command set up. Furthermore, the proportions of Unsafe Supervision factor 
citation were also similar. Again, like the Organisational Influences, rotary-wing 
incidents had only a slightly higher proportion of narratives reporting each of the four 
Unsafe Supervision factors than fixed-wing. The differences are too small to warrant 
further investigation or explanation. 
The factor frequency differences found between fixed-wing and rotary-wing 
incidents in HF ACS level 3 Preconditions of Unsafe Acts warrant mention. In 
particular, fixed-wing incidents were more likely to be cited as containing influencing 
factors associated with 'physical environment', 'CRM', and 'adverse mental states' than 
rotary-wing incidents, which were significantly more likely to be associated with factors 
reflecting 'personal readiness'. 'Adverse physiological states' were slightly more 
common in fixed-wing incidents which is unexpected considering the helicopter cockpit 
has significantly more physiologically demanding noise and vibration compared to a 
fixed-wing cockpit (O'Hare, Chalmers, & Scuffham, 2006). 
Lastly, the present analysis represented large and statistically significant 
differences between fixed and rotary-wing in the HF ACS level most immediate to the 
incident, Unsafe Acts of Operators. Rotary-wing incidents were proportionately more 
frequently associated with 'skill-based errors', and proportionately less likely to be 
associated with 'decision-based' and 'perceptual-based errors' than incidents involving 
fixed-wing aircraft. 
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Cognitive Error Taxonomy. Overall, the present data analysis illustrated a 
significantly larger proportion of action errors cited in rotary-wing incidents compared 
to fixed-wing. Fixed-wing incident reports were more frequently associated with goal 
and strategy errors than rotary-wing. Both procedure and action error types were more 
likely to be associated with rotary-wing incidents, and this was supported statistically in 
the latter case. The remaining taxonomic cognitive error types - detection, diagnosis, 
goal, and strategy- had greater occurrence probabilities in fixed-wing than rotary-wing 
aircraft incidents in the current study. 
In contrast, Zotov ( 1997) found that all the cognitive error types in the 
taxonomy, except strategy, were more often associated with fixed-wing accidents. There 
could be two main reasons for the differences between the current study and Zotov' s 
(1997) study. The first is that Zotov (1997) included only accidents with fatal 
consequences, whereas the present analysis was primarily conducted using incident 
reports with non-fatal consequences. In fact, only one of the 288 reports examined had a 
fatality. The second reason for the difference could be the difference in aviation sectors 
analysed- in this case military versus civilian. 
Performance Shaping Factors Analysis 
Originally developed to supplement the cognitive error taxonomy, the 
performance shaping factors analysis provides a different insight into an incident. The 
complexity of the operational environment and the individual interaction was well 
delineated by this aspect in the current analysis. According to Rasmussen's (1982) 
definition the performance shaping factors were essentially conditions that may affect 
the likelihood of an error occurring but do not cause the errors. Rasmussen (1982) 
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argued it is necessary to include such conditioning factors as they may mitigate 
motivational and physical aspects of an individual. They may have an effect on that 
individual's capability to function and make subjective choices in the operational 
environment. Situational factors are easily identifiable as contributory to error. 
The performance shaping factors most often associated with the incidents in the 
present study were 'unusual external conditions' and 'no training for the situation'. This 
finding is similar to those found by O'Hare (2006), who also reported 'task 
interference' as a frequently cited factor. The least cited performance shaping factor in 
the current analysis was 'unusual internal conditions' such as heat and vibration. 
'Physical incapacitation' was also rarely cited, which replicates O'Hare's (2006) 
findings. The reason for the high occurrence of 'unusual external conditions' and 'no 
training for the situation' factors may be that these factors are readily recognizable 
(Rasmussen, 1982). Their impact in aviation accidents and incidents is well catalogued 
and, for the most part, understood. In contrast, cockpit environment appears to be 
largely overlooked as contributory to incidents and therefore is rarely reported. 
Seven of the ten performance shaping factors were more likely to be associated 
with fixed-wing incidents rather than rotary-wing. In particular, citations of demand 
factors specific to the pilot (for example, 'physical incapacitation', 'impaired mental 
state', and 'excessive workload') were shown to be more often associated with fixed-
wing pilots. 'Unusual external conditions' were significantly more likely to be 
associated with fixed-wing incidents than rotary. Conversely, performance shaping 
factors involving training were more frequently associated with rotary-wing incidents 
than fixed-wing in the present study. This finding was statistically significant. Both 
fixed and rotary-wing incidents were as likely to have involved workload demand 
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characteristics such as distractions or interference from other people or tasks. This is 
interesting considering the diversity of tasks and crew make-up between fixed-wing 
aircraft and rotary-wing aircraft operation. 
Following O'Hare (2006), binary logistic regressions were calculated with the 
cognitive error type as the predicted variable and the ten performance shaping factors as 
the predictor variables. The all-inclusive analysis found no significant predictors of 
diagnosis, goal, strategy, or procedure error type, which was the opposite of O'Hare's 
(2006) analysis. The likelihood of a detection error occurring was significantly 
increased by interference from another task as well as by unusual external conditions. 
No training for the situation significantly increased the probability of an action error. 
Detection errors and diagnosis errors also had significant predictors when the data were 
divided into fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. However, the predictors were different 
for each aircraft category. In a fixed-wing aircraft, the likelihood of detection errors was 
increased by external conditions whereas faulty training increased diagnosis errors. The 
probability of detection diagnosis errors in rotary-wing aircraft was greater in the 
presence of task interference and impaired mental state. Lack of training affected the 
likelihood of action errors in fixed-wing aircraft incidents. 
Phase of Flight Analysis 
The majority ofthe flight safety incidents in the present sample occurred during 
the cruise or maneuvering phase of flight (36.5%). Findings from the examination of 
general and commercial aviation have tended towards lower numbers of errors 
committed in the cruise phase. For example, in a study involving general aviation 
(Lenne et al., 2008) 12.9% of errors committed were done so in cruise. Descent or 
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landing phases of flight had the next highest frequency of errors in the present study 
(26% ), which is similar to the proportions found in both commercial and general aircraft 
accidents (Lenne et al., 2008; O'Hare (2006). Interestingly, O'Hare (2006) found that 
accidents were disproportionately associated with landing and incidents were more 
likely to be associated with cruise phases of flight. This difference was significant. As 
the majority of the flight safety events used in this study were incidents as opposed to 
accidents, the frequency of human errors committed in the cruise phase of flight is 
supportive of O'Hare's (2006) findings. Errors committed during take-off appear to be 
of similar frequency across the board. 
Fixed-wing aircraft were found to have significantly more take-off incidents 
than rotary-wing (27.3% versus 13.4%). Fixed-wing had less instances of error in the 
cruise (43.3%) and landing (29.3%) flight phases than rotary-wing (48.8%- cruise; and, 
37.8% - landing). These findings could be a reflection of the complexity of helicopter 
landings and maneuvering in general, as well as the intricacy of helicopter descent into 
unusual, often dangerous, landing zones. O'Hare et al. (2006) claim that there are 
additional challenges for a pilot flying a helicopter over an extended period than 
equivalent fixed-wing flight, which is in support of the current findings. Conversely, the 
number of different procedures used by various airports frequented by the fixed-wing 
aircraft analysed here may make the take-off sequence less tolerant to pilot error. 
Applicability 
HFACS. HFACS contains four levels, each level with three or more factors. The 
fourth level, Organisational Influences, was represented 86 times in the narratives. The 
factors of the third level, Unsafe Supervision', were reported 107 times overall. 
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Preconditions of Unsafe Acts, the second HF ACS level which encompasses seven 
different factors, were cited 308 times signifying that some incidents had more than one 
precondition. Finally, 286 of the 288 (99.3%) incidents could be classified into level 
one, Unsafe Acts of Operators. 
Each ofthe 19 categories ofHFACS was represented at least once in the present 
data. This allows accident investigation practitioners to be reasonably confident in the 
pattern of results found (Li & Harris, 2006). Other studies have reported similar 
instances of the HF ACS categories, suggesting applicability across industrial settings 
and aviation sectors (Baysari et al., 2008; Gaur, 2006; Li & Harris, 2006; Shappell et 
al., 2007). The one area in which a number of HF ACS categories are underrepresented 
in the empirical literature is general aviation (Lenne et al., 2008; Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2005). The HF ACS levels of Organisational Influences and Unsafe 
Supervision have been rarely cited in these studies. As outlined in the introduction, this 
is expected as most sectors of general aviation are privately, . as opposed to 
organisationally, operated without a large supervisory hierarchy. 
The few low occurrences of certain HF ACS categories shown may be associated 
with the fact that they feature less tangible subject matters, such as 'organisational 
climate', or with the potential sensitivity of the issues they address, for example, 
'supervisory violations' (Li & Harris, 2006). Indeed, the current study had only one 
instance of 'supervisory violation', very low occurrences of 'failure to correct a known 
problem', and only one instance of 'physical/mental limitation' out of the 288 incidents 
analysed. Also congruent with the sensitivity argument, is the lack of citation within the 
narratives of operator violations ('routine violations' were cited three times, and 
'exceptional violations' were cited twice). 
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Interestingly, Shappell et al. (2007) found the reverse with violations of 
operators being identified in 23.1% of accidents involving commercial aircraft. This 
discrepancy should not be ignored. Disregarding the sensitivity issue and assuming the 
military aviators of this study actually do commit few violations, then what are they 
doing differently to the commercial aircraft operators? What implications would this 
fmding have for commercial aviation intervention strategies? Commercial aviation 
organisations should endeavor to isolate the differences in intervention approaches at 
this level between them and the military, and adapt their original policies to include 
aspects that have reduced violations in the military. Alternatively, the present sample 
consists of reports submitted voluntarily whereas the other studies contained mandatory 
reports, which provides an entirely different outlook. That is, it is natural to assume 
individuals who have cornrpitted a violation would be less likely to admit to it if they 
were not required to. 
Shappell et al.'s (2007) results were almost identical with respect to HF ACS 
level three factors 'supervisory violation' and 'failure to correct a known problem', 
suggesting the sensitivity of issues at this level may have an impact on reporting in 
incident narratives. 
Overall, the HF ACS framework appears to relevantly classify all of the human 
factors in an aviation incident. As a consequence of failures being identified at each of 
the four levels of HF ACS, it is logical to assume support for a systems approach in 
aviation accident analysis, as well as for Reason's (1990) model. Practically, it may be 
necessary to introduce measures of reducing blame so individuals from management, in 
addition to the operators themselves, do not shy away from admitting to violations. 
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Cognitive Error Taxonomy. The Cognitive Error Taxonomy consisted of six 
stages of human error, in addition to 'mechanical failure'. Of the 288 incidents 
involving human factors analysed in the present study, 281 (97.6%) could be classified 
using one of the six elements of the Cognitive Error Taxonomy. Each of the six errors 
of the Cognitive Error Taxonomy - that is, detection, diagnosis, goal, strategy, 
procedure, or action - was represented in at least 14 instances or more in the present 
data. No 'mechanical failures' were reported in this study. This is because only 
incidents within the database with human factors were considered for the analysis. 
However, upon reading several mechanically-related mishap narratives from the 
database utilized in the study, it was clear that coding mechanical failures as defined by 
the taxonomy would be similar to coding the presence of the other elements anyway. 
Previous research involving the Cognitive Error Taxonomy has shown similar 
applicability (Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997). In a study using United States Navy and 
Marine flight-related mishaps database, of the 289 incidents involving human factors 
264 (91.3%) were classified into one of the six elements of the taxonomy (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 1997). Furthermore, when applied to the whole database ( 4,279 cases with 
human factors) 88.43% were classified using the taxonomy. 
Despite the above similarities, however, O'Hare et al. (1994) was only able to 
code 261 mishaps out of 3 73 (70%) into one of the six cognitive error classifications of 
the taxonomy. Nonetheless, the remaining 30% were said to be either 'mechanical 
failure' or uncodable so in theory the seven element taxonomy could have accounted for 
a larger proportional of incidents analysed in O'Hare et al.'s (1994) study. In fact, in a 
similar capacity, O'Hare (2006) conducted another study using the Cognitive Error 
Taxonomy in 2006 that classified approximately one third of all mishaps as beyond 
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intervention. Both studies used samples from a civilian population as opposed to a 
military population. These samples included accidents and incidents from both general 
and commercial aviation sectors, as defined in the introduction. 
Cohen' s kappa was used to clarify the reliability of the Cognitive Error 
Taxonomy coding. The value found when pairing the evaluations of the novice coder 
with the benchmark expert was 0.685 with 73.3% agreement, which according to Landis 
and Koch (1977) corresponds to a relatively substantial level of concurrence. O'Hare' et 
al. (1994) reported similar levels of inter-coder reliability despite having only brief 
narratives to work from. These reliability findings suggest consistent applicability is 
possible with the Cognitive Error Taxonomy. 
Any differences between the present findings and the aforementioned studies 
may be due to memory bias, as O'Hare (2006) used a retrospective questionnaire 
answered by incident-involved pilots. Still, the applicability of the taxonomy is 
demonstrated in the high percentage of incidents that could be classified by the six error 
elements, as well as the satisfactory reliability scores found. 
Practical Implications 
HFACS. Culturally, the application of HFACS has produced mixed results. Li 
and Harris (2006) successfully completed their study on a sample of accidents obtained 
from the Republic of China Air Force suggesting that the HF ACS framework can be 
used as an analysis tool across languages and cultures. The present analysis also showed 
HF ACS adaptability to a different culture. Similarities in the commercial aviation data 
between United States (Shappell et al., 2007) and India (Gaur, 2005) attest to the fact 
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that aircraft accidents have repetitive causative factors that " ... transcend [ s] national 
and cultural boundaries" (Gaur, 2005, p.504). 
Li and Harris (2005) found that in high power distance collectivist cultures, 
supervisory and organisational factors have greater influence than they do in 
individualist cultures such as the United States. Hofstede (1984) defined a high power 
distance culture as extremely mindful of overt status rankings, whereas individualist 
cultures contain loose social networks with an emphasis on individual development. 
Despite this, they found factors at the lower levels (one and two) of HF ACS were 
generally similar (Li & Harris, 2005). Interestingly, the results of a study conducted by 
Li et al. (2008) on commercial aviation accidents demonstrated similar findings to that 
of a military study in the same country. 
Using lambda, which clearly defmes the direction and strength of a relationship 
between two factors, allowed the analysis of the pathways connecting each of the four 
levels of HF ACS. The major argument drawn from the present research is that 
investigators potentially will be able to reduce accident rates by establishing and 
addressing these pathways (Li et al., 2008). Interventions at higher levels ofthe HFACS 
framework seem more likely to have a greater effect on improving overall safety than 
targeting errors at lower levels of the framework. 
Li and Harris (2006) noted that the significant associations established using 
Lambda suggest intervention strategies at levels 1 and 2 only would have limited effect. 
Moreover, higher-level interventions would probably prove to incur less strain on 
resources. In addition, due to the fact that each HF ACS category is fairly specific, 
specific error-focused prevention strategies can be employed. This supports the 
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practicality of HF ACS as a useful tool in targeting money-saving, easily applied safety 
initiatives 
The practicality of HF ACS could be limited in that while it is reasonably 
comprehensive, it does not provide a means of overcoming the possibility of 
considerable time separation between the occurrences of errors at the different levels of 
the framework. Sometimes the time lag can be several years, such as the China Airlines 
Cl -611 crash in which the primary causal factor was established as taking place 22 
years before the accident (Li et al., 2008). The primary cause in this case was " ... a 
failure to follow the Structural Repair Manual for the repair of a tail strike occurring to 
the aircraft 22 years prior to the accident'' (Li et al., 2008, p.432). In addition, 
supervisory and organisational errors are typically committed well before the accident 
happens and are difficult to implicate as they are rarely noted down at the time. To 
overcome this, extensive, common databases need to be maintained. 
The low frequency of supervisory and organisational factors found in previous 
HF ACS analyses on general aviation is somewhat puzzling (Lenne et al., 2008). As 
referred to earlier, to an extent defining supervisory roles can be difficult within the 
realms of general and commercial aviation (Gaur, 2005). To increase the practicality of 
HF ACS in this sense, the translation of domain-specific knowledge needs to be well 
thought out and detailed regarding these previously ambiguous roles. 
Finally, the HFACS analysis (and the Cognitive Error Taxonomy analysis) 
produced some practical considerations for the Australasian Military Organisation from 
which the database was obtained. The relational structure delineated by HF ACS 
suggests that while intervention measures implemented at the lower levels may help 
reduce the instance of certain errors, prevention strategies would be more instrumental 
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if introduced at higher levels of the organisation in addition to the policies already in 
place. As far as the database goes, HF ACS was relatively easy to apply signifying not 
only that HF ACS, itself, is generalisable, but also that the database had a 
straightforward, comprehensive structure. The fact that data collection and analysis is 
electronic, and subject to numerous facets of expertise such as engineers and safety 
staff, is of huge benefit in that a very detailed, yet objective, narrative is provided for 
each incident. 
Cognitive Error Taxonomy. The results described here, and in other studies 
(O'Hare et al., 1994; O'Hare, 2006), indicate that analyzing the initiating event post-
incident and post-accident can offer insight into the cognitive mechanisms behind the 
error. Not only that, previously unidentified trends within the data and underlying 
causal factors can be exposed with the taxonomy as it allows for the organisation of 
pilot error into identifiable, and therefore remediable, functions. In an applied sense, the 
foremost implication of the findings using the Cognitive Error Taxonomy is that every 
aviation incident/accident/crash is unique (O'Hare, 2006). Furthermore, in addition to 
the post-accident analysis, supplementary interviews, focus groups, and discussion 
forums should be conducted with aircrew involved (O'Hare et al., 1994). The reason for 
this is that it helps protect against the possibility that the fmdings from the data are not 
simply reflections of the rater' s beliefs as opposed to the actual evidence within the data 
(O'Hare et al., 1994). 
Data loss, a common problem in this aspect of aviation accident classification, 
may detrimentally affect the practicality of the Cognitive Error Taxonomy. Even brief 
summaries of incidents contain a myriad of relevant human factors information that 
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when analysed together aids in the understanding of the causal sequence of events that 
resulted in the generation of that report. In an incident, these causal factors may range 
from far-removed to proximal occurrences to the incident, and everything in between. 
Given this drawback, the present study found that the simple logical structure of the 
taxonomy was easily applicable to reports ranging from highly technical and detailed to 
one-line narratives. 
Theoretical Implications 
As considered in the introduction, the last two decades has seen a shift in the 
emphasis of accident investigations. Nowadays the focus has moved to include 
decision-making, supervisory, and organisational factors, whereas the cause of an 
accident or incident within aviation used to be found primarily with the frontline 
operator's skill deficiencies (Li & Harris, 2005). The many human factor perspectives 
have been successfully combined to create the capacity to identify underlying causes 
and trends throughout an organisation. One of the main advocates of these 
developments has been James Reason, whose 'Swiss Cheese' model (Reason, 1990) 
provided the impetus and foundation for HF ACS. 
Reason (1990) based his model of active and latent failures on the hypothesis 
that " ... inappropriate decision-making by upper-level management can adversely 
influence the personnel and practices at the supervisory level, which in turn affects the 
psychological pre-conditions and hence the subsequent actions of the frontline 
operators" (cited in Li et al., 2008, p.431). The current analysis, in addition to a number 
of other studies (Li & Harris, 2006; Li et al., 2008; Lenne et al., 2008; Shappell et al., 
2007; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001; 2003; 2005; Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997; 1999; 
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2001) provides an interrelationship and category analysis 
that affords some statistical 
support for these hypothesized associations. 
Wiegmann and Shappell (2001) believe HFACS bridges th
e gap between theory 
and practice. On the surface, HF ACS does appear to mee
t this assumption. However, 
despite the respectable level of reliability reported in thi
s study, the vast differences 
within the data when compared to similar database finding
s is indicative that different 
samples have different characteristics. Therefore, HF A
CS may fall short as a 
standardized tool for applying intervention and prevention
 policies. That being said, if 
the databases were standardized instead, HF ACS could be
 a very powerful tool in the 
classification and prevention of error within aviation. 
The theory of systemic classification of information is roo
ted in the notion that 
factors relevant to an air mishap can be highlighted, e
valuated, and appropriately 
addressed. In doing so, a classification system can hypoth
etically tell the true story of 
an accident or incident with objectivity and validity. HF A
CS goes some way in doing 
this. Recently, it has been the most resourced accident inv
estigation tool. Despite this, 
development needs to continue to increase diagnostic
ity and reliability without 
disrupting the framework's well-established usability. In p
articular, due to the fact that 
failures at organisational level are often far-removed temp
orally as well as physically 
from the operator error, it is difficult for accident investigat
ors to establish the necessary 
link between the two. As such, the practicality of tools lik
e HF ACS are limited in that 
error reduction and prevention techniques cannot be readily
 implemented. 
While HF ACS appears to meet the requirements of a the
oretically applicable 
classification system, it falls out of the bounds of the philo
sophical perspective held by 
Dekker and his European colleagues. Dekker (2001a, 200
3) maintains the notion that 
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classification systems lacking clear category descriptions are subject to simple error 
counting which he argues is pseudoscience. According to this proposal, the endeavor to 
map complex human behaviour into broad conceptual categories, such as 'skill-based 
errors' without considerable thought given to the possible context-specific influences is 
fruitless (Dekker, 200lb). 
In addition, Dekker (2003) puts forward the argument that attempting to explain 
the underlying causes of an error by implicating preconditions as well as supervisory 
and organisational factors " ... displaces the interpretive load ... " (p.99) creating an 
illusion of deeper understanding. Dekker (2001b) does concede that the proposed gaps 
in the theory of error classification do stem from conventional limitations in the 
collection of usable human factors data. This leads to the question: can we meaningfully 
assign errors to classifications and assume that this is the equivalent to analysis 
(Dekker, 2001a)? 
Despite the above propositions, the classification of error can and does have 
some merit practically. As an accident investigation tool a classification system such as 
HF ACS may be limited, however as a human factors analysis system it has value in the 
identification of how and where safety initiatives could be implemented. The present 
analysis showed interesting trends and correlations within the organisation analysed that 
may warrant safety intervention. 
Future Directions 
The findings of the present study revealed numerous interactions and trends 
mentioned above, as well as delineating directions within aviation accident and incident 
investigation for future development. Firstly, the most appropriate sample size of 
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reports analysed needs to be determined. The present st
udy had a relatively typical 
sample size. More incidents might have generated stronge
r statistical associations, but 
too many more would have been resource exhausting. Ab
solute care must be taken in 
interpreting results garnered from sample sizes any s
maller than used here, as 
proportions will be distorted. Additionally, differentiating b
etween accident populations 
and incident populations could provide more insight into th
e nature of aviation mishaps 
(Li & Harris, 2006; Li et al., 2008). 
Throughout the current research conducted, it has becom
e clear that there is 
some ambiguity between the definitions of 'general 
aviation' and 'commercial 
aviation'. This ambiguity undercuts the ability to compa
re the nature and causes of 
accidents between aviation sectors. Future research out
lining and solidifYing these 
definitions within the industry may lead to beneficial disco
veries. One example is, if a 
certain type of error is occurring within one sector more 
than the others, it may be a 
result of not employing a particular training strategy that t
he remaining sectors utilize. 
There are many, many more benefits to be found. Employin
g the identified strategy may 
reduce those types of errors in that specific sector. Furth
ermore, accidents involving 
military pilots flying in off-duty activities (general aviati
on) have been identified as 
warranting consideration with an emphasis on improving i
nter-sector safety (Gillis, Li, 
& Baker, 2001). 
While HF ACS distinguishes between error types at the 'un
safe acts of operator' 
level, specificity is only partial. The present study u
tilized the Cognitive Error 
Taxonomy as a means of further differentiating the erro
r type, with some success. 
However, one might argue that the knowledge of the exact
 error that was incurred may 
lead to more explicitly targeted interventions and therefo
re to reduced accident rates. 
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There seems to be merit is dividing the categories further, but care must be taken in 
maintaining usability as well as diagnosticity. Additionally, it makes sense to ascertain 
how often each 'unsafe act' error type is the foremost cause of an aviation mishap 
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2005). In the case of this study, just over 50% of incident 
reports cited an association with a skill-based error. The question is: are skill-based 
errors the initiating factor in these incidents? And if the answer is yes, then how often is 
this? 
A notably overlooked area of future development in the area of aviation accident 
analysis and prevention is the investigators, themselves. Most field investigators were 
once operators, and it was generally thought they are not often overly familiar with the 
influence of human factors (Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997). The times are changing, 
however, and the awareness of psychological and human factors concepts is increasing 
every year. As a result, the usefulness of classification frameworks is increasing with 
understanding as well. HF ACS as a practical tool would benefit from a targeted field 
investigator education program. 
The aforementioned points lead to the next step in accident investigation -
developing a standardized industry language to improve the quality of information and 
communication. The overall aim should consist of the development of universal 
definitions and taxonomies, improved statistical analysis, and increased accuracy of 
reporting as well as interventions. This can be achieved through consistency of data 
entry and storage. For example, ifHFACS was used as a template in addition to existing 
databases, more obvious connections and trends may be identified. 
Analyses of the strength of relationships between latent and active failures 
greatly facilitated the understanding of theories in addition to providing information 
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about the causal chain of events. Thus, it 
is becoming increasingly necessary to 
construct relational databases and conduct rela
tional analyses (like lambda used in the 
present study) to reliably apply appropriate inte
rvention strategies. A relational database 
essentially allows investigators to not only i
dentify the contributory factors to an 
incident, but also the relationship between t
hose factors. In a practical sense, the 
capacity to collect less, more meaningful, dat
a can be accomplished using a better-
developed HF ACS standardization. Future r
esearch might investigate further the 
advantages of these suggestions. And, once
 the above is implemented, research 
attempting to determine the impact of interve
ntions and safety initiatives on overall 




Adams, E. (1976). Accident causation and the management system. Professional 
Safety, 2I, 26-29. 
Anastasi, A. (1988). Psychological Testing (6
111 Ed). New York: Macmillan. 
Baysari, M., Mclntosh, A., & Wilson, J. (2008). Understanding the human factors 
contribution to railway accidents and incidents in Australia. Accident Analysis 
and Prevention, 40, 1750-1757. 
Beaubien, J., & Baker, D. (2002). A review of selected aviation taxonomies, 
accident/incident reporting systems, and data collection tools. International 
Journal of Applied Aviation Studies, 2, 11-36. 
Bird, F. (1974). Management Guide to Loss Control. Atlanta, GA: Institute Press. 
Dekker, S. (2001a). The re-invention of human error. Human Factors and Aerospace 
Safety, I, 24 7-266. 
Dekker, S. (2001b). The disembodiment of data in the analysis of human factors 
accidents. Human Factors and Aerospace Safety, I, 39-57. 
117 
Dekker, S. (2003). Illusions of explanation: A critical essay on error classification. 
The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 13, 95-106. 
Degani, A., & Wiener, E. (1994). Philosophy, policies, procedures, and practice: The 
four "P's" of flight deck operations. Aviation Psychology in Practice. (pp.44-
67). Brookefield, VT: Ashgate. 
Edwards, E. (1988). Introductory Overview. In Wiener, E., & Nagel, D. (Eds.) Human 
Factors in Aviation. (pp.3-25). Academic Press, Inc. 
Fitts, P., & Jones, R. (1947). Psychological aspects of instrument display I: Analysis 
of 270 'pilot error' experiences in reading and interpreting aircraft 
instuments. (Report No. TSEAA-694-12). Daytpn, OH: Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base, Aeromedical Laboratory, Air Material Command. 
Gaur, D. (2005). Human factors analysis and classification system applied to civil 
aircraft accidents in India. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 76, 
501-505 
Gillis, L., Li, G., & Baker, S. (2001). General aviation crashes involving military 
personnel as pilots. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 72, 1001-
1005. 
118 
Goode, J. (2003). Are pilots at risk of accidents due to fatigue? Journal of 
Safety Research, 34, 309-313. 
Goodman, L., & Kruskal, W. (1954). Measures of association for cross-
classifications. American Statistical Association Journal, 49, 732-764. 
Graeber, R. (1988). Aircrew Fatigue and Circadian Rhythmicity. In Wiener, E., & 
Nagel, D. (Eds.) Human Factors in Aviation. (pp. 305-344). Academic Press. 
Haddon, W., Suchman, E., & Klein, D. (1964). Accident Research: Methods and 
Approaches. New York: Harper & Row. 
Hansen, F. (2006). Human error: A concept analysis. Journal of Air Transportation, 
11, 61-77. 
Heinrich, H., Petersen, D., & Roos, N. (1980). Industrial Accident Prevention: A 
Safety Management Approach (5th Ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Helmreich, R., Foushee, H., Benson, R., & Russini, W. (1986). Cockpit resource 
management: Exploring the attitude-performance linkage. Aviation, Space, 
and Environmental Medicine, 57, 1198-1200. 
Hofstede, G. (1984). Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-
related Values. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
119 
Kanki, B., & Palmer, M. (1993). Communication and Crew Resource Management. In 
Wiener, E., Kanki, B., & Helmreich, R. (Eds.) Cockpit Resource Management. 
(pp. 99-136). San Diego, CA, US: Academic Press. 
Keppel, G., & Saufley, W. (1980). Introduction to Design and Analysis: A Students 
Handbook. W.H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco. 
Khatwa, R., & Helmreich, R. L. (1998). Analysis of critical factors during approach 
and landing in accidents and normal flight. Flight Saftty Digest, 1-92. 
Kinnersley, S., & Roelen, A. (2007) . The contribution of design to accidents. Safety 
Science, 45, 31-60. 
Klinect, J., Murray, P., Merritt, A., & Helmreich, R. (2003). Line Operations Safety 
Audit (LOSA): Definitions and operating characteristics. Proceedings of the 1 ih 
International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 663-668. Retrieved April 6, 
2009, from 
http:/ /home page. psv. utexas. edulhomepage/Group/HelmreichLABI Aviation/LOS 
AILOSA.html. 
Koz, J. (1985) . An analysis of accident proneness in the fighter pilot. Dissertation 
Abstracts International, 45, 2734. 
120 
Krulak, D. (2004). Human factors in maintenance: Impact on aircraft mishap 
frequency and severity. Aviation, Space, & Environmental Medicine, 75, 429-
432. 
Landis, J., & Koch, G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for 
categorical data. Biometrics, 33, 159-174. 
Lardent, C. (1991). Pilots who crash: Personality constructs underlying accident prone 
behavior of fighter pilots. Multivariate Experimental Clinical Research, 10, 1-
25. 
Lautman, L., & Gallimore, P. (1987). Control of the crew caused accident: Results of 
a 12-operator survey. Boeing Airliner, 1-6. 
Lenne, M., Ashby, K., & Fitzharris, M. (2008). Analysis of general aviation crashes in 
Australia using the human factors analysis and classification system. The 
International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 18, 340-352. 
Li, W., & Harris, D. (2005). HFACS analysis ofROC Air Force aviation accidents: 
Reliability, analysis, and cross-cultural comparison. International Journal of 
Applied Aviation Studies, 5, 65-81. 
121 
Li, W., & Harris, D. (2006). Pilot error and its relationship with higher organisational 
levels: HF ACS analysis of 523 accidents. Aviation, Space, and Environmental 
Medicine, 77, 1056-1061. 
Li, W., Harris, D., & Yu, C. (2008). Routes to failure: Analysis of 41 civil aviation 
accidents from the Republic of China using the human factors analysis and 
classification system. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 40, 426-434. 
Nagel, D. (1988). Human error in aviation operations. In Wiener, E., & Nagel, D. 
(Eds.) Human Factors in Aviation. (pp.263-303) Academic Press, Inc. 
Neubauer, J., Murdock, E., Fraser, J., & Veronneau, S. (1998). The year in review: 
Aviation safety update for FY 1998. Aviation, Space, and Environmental 
Medicine, 70, 393-394. 
O'Connor, P. (2008). HF ACS with an additional layer of granularity: Validity and 
utility in accident analysis. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 79, 
599-606. 
O'Hare, D., Wiggins, M., Batt, R., & Morrison, D. (1994). Cognitive failure analysis 
for aircraft accident investigation. Ergonomics, 3 7, 185 5-1869. 
122 
O'Hare, D., & Srnitheram, T. (1995). "Pressing on" into deteriorating conditions: An 
application of behavioural decision theory to pilot decision-making. 
International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 5, 351-370. 
O'Hare, D. (2000). The 'wheel of misfortune': A taxonomic approach to human 
factors in accident investigation and analysis in aviation and other complex 
systems. Ergonomics, 43, 2001-2019. 
O'Hare, D. (2006). Cognitive functions and performance shaping factors in aviation 
accidents and incidents. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 16, 
145-156. 
O'Hare, D., Chalmers, D., & Scufiham, P. (2006). Case-control study of risk factors 
for fatal and non-fatal injury in crashes of rotary-wing aircraft. Journal of 
Safety Research, 37, 293-298. 
Rasmussen, J. (1982). Human errors: A taxonomy for describing human malfunction 
in industrial installations. Journal of Occupational Accidents, 4, 311-333. 
Reason, J. (1990). Human Error. Cambridge University Press. 
Reason, J., Manstead, A., Stradling, S., Baxter, J., & Campbell, K. (1990). Errors and 
violations on the roads: A real distinction? Ergonomics, 33, 1315-1332. 
123 
Reinach, S., & Viale, A. (2006). Application of a human error framework to conduct 
train accident/incident investigations. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 38, 
396-406. 
Senders, J., & Moray, N. (1991). Human Error: Cause, Prediction, and Reduction. 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.: Hillsdale, NJ. 
Shappell, S., & Wiegmann, D. (1996). U.S. naval aviation mishaps 1977-1992: 
Differences between single- and dual-piloted aircraft. Aviation, Space, and 
Environment Medicine, 67, 65-69. 
Shappell, S., & Wiegmann, D. (1997). A human error approach to accident 
investigation: The taxonomy of unsafe operations. The International Journal 
of Aviation Psychology, 7, 269-291. 
Shappell, S., Wiegmann, D., Fraser, J., Gregory, G., Kinsley, P., & Squier, H. (1999). 
Beyond mishap rates: A human factors analysis ofU.S. Navy/Marine Corps 
TACAIR and rotary wing mishaps using HF ACS. Aviation, Space, and 
Enironmental Medicine, 70, 416-417. 
Shappell, S., & Wiegmann, D. (2001). Applying reason: The human factors analysis 
and classification system (HF ACS). Human Factors and Aerospace Safety, 1, 
59-86. 
124 
Shappell, S., Detwiler, C., Holcomb, K., Hackworth, C., Boquet, A. & Wiegmann, D. 
(2007). Human error and commercial aviation accidents: An analysis using the 
human factors analysis and classification system. Human Factors, 49, 227-
242. 
Shappell, S., & Wiegmann, D. (2003). Reshaping the way we look at general aviation 
accidents using the human factors analysis and classification system 
(HF ACS). Proceedings of the International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology, 12, 1047-1052. Retreived May 6, 2009, from 
http://www.hf.faa.gov/docs/508/docs/HF ACSFY03.pdf 
Shappell, S., & Wiegmann, D. (2005). Human error and general aviation accidents: A 
comprehensive, fine-grained analysis using HF ACS. Oklahoma City, OK: 
Federal Aviation Authority. Retreived May 6, 2009, from 
www.hf.faa.gov/docs/508/docs/gaFY04HF ACSrpt.pdf 
Skinner, B. (1974). About Behaviourism. New York: Vintage Books. 
Sloan, S., & Cooper, C. (1986). Pilots Under Stress. Routledge & Kegan Paul: 
London & New York. 
Suchman, E. (1961). A Conceptual Analysis of Accident Phenomenon, Behavioural 
Approaches to Accident Research. New York: Association for the Aid of 
Crippled Children. 
125 
Taneja, N. (2002). Human factors in aircraft accidents: A holistic approach to 
intervention strategies. Proceedings of the 46th Annual Meeting of the Human 
Factors and Ergonomics Society. Santa Monica, Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society 
Tvaryanas, A., Thompson, W., & Constable, S. (2006). Human factors in remotely 
piloted aircraft operations: HF A CS analysis of 221 mishaps over 10 years. 
Aviation, Space, and Environment Medicine, 77, 724-732. 
von Thaden, T., Wiegmann, D., & Shappell, S. (2006). Organisational factors in 
commercial aviation accidents. The International Journal of Aviation 
Psychology, 16, 239-261. 
Weick, K., & Roberts K. (1993). Collective mind in organisations: Heedful 
interrelating on flight decks. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 357-381. 
Wiegmann, D., & Shappell, S. (1997). Human factors analysis of post-accident data: 
Applying theoretical taxonomies of human error. The International Journal of 
Aviation Psychology, 7, 67-81. 
Wiegmann, D., & Shappell, S. (1999). Human error and crew resource management 
failures in naval safety center data. Aviation, Space, and Environmental 
Medicine, 70, 1147-1151. 
126 
Wiegmann, D., & Shappell, S. (2001). Human error perspectives in aviation. The 
International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 11, 341-357. 
Wiegmann, D., & Shappell, S. (2003). A Human Error Approach to Aviation Accident 
Analysis: The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System. Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate Publishing. 
Wickens, C., & Flach, J. (1988). Information processing. In Wiener, E., & Nagel, D. 
(Eds.) Human Factors in Aviation. (pp.111-115) Academic Press, Inc. 
Yacavone, D. (1993). Mishap trends and cause factors in naval aviation: A review of 
the naval safety center data. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 64, 
392-395. 
Zotov, D. (1997). Pilot error: Cognitive failure analysis. Unpublished Masters thesis. 






UNSAFE ACTS OF OPERATORS 
Errors 'mental or physical activities of individuals that fail to achieve their 
intended outcome'. 
Skill-based: Basic flight skills that occur without significant conscious thought. 
These skill-based actions are particularly vulnerable to failures of attention and/or 
memory, as well as technique errors. 
Decision: An intentional behaviour proceeds as planned, yet the plan itself is 
inadequate or inappropriate for the situation. There are explicit procedures performed at 
all phases of flight. Decision errors occur when a situation is either not recognised or 
misdiagnosed, and the wrong procedure is applied. Decision errors also occur when 
inadequate knowledge of systems is present as well as when the correct procedure 
exceeds the ability of the pilot. 
Perceptual: Errors occur when sensory input is either degraded or 'unusual' and 
perception of the world differs from reality. Examples include visual illusions, spatial 
disorientation, and common misjudgements. 
Violations 'the wilful disregard for the rules and regulations that govern the safety 
of flight'. 
Routine: These violations tend to be habitual and often tolerated by governing 
authority. 
Exceptional: These violations emerge as isolated departures from authority, not 
necessarily indicative of an individual's typical behaviour pattern, nor condoned by 
management. 
PRECONDITIONS FOR UNSAFE ACTS 
Environmental Factors 
Physical: This term refers to both the operational environment (weather, 
altitude, terrain etc) and the ambient environment in the cockpit (heat, vibrations, 
lighting etc ). 
Technological: This term encompasses a number of issues including the design 
of equipment and controls, display/interface characteristics, checklist layouts, task 
factors and automation. 
Personnel Factors 
Crew Resource Management: Within the context of aviation, CRM includes 
coordination within and between aircraft, as well as air traffic control, maintenance and 
other support personneL Teamwork, assertiveness, communication, adequate briefs and 
leadership are important aspects of CRM. 
Personal Readiness: A breakdown in personal readiness can occur when 
individuals fail to prepare physically or mentally for duty. Examples of this may be 




Conditions of Operators 
Adverse Mental States: Mental conditions that affect performance. Also included 
in this category are personality traits and pernicious attitudes. 
Adverse Physiological States: The medical or physiological conditions that 
preclude safe operations. Examples include hypoxia,illness, intoxication, motion 
sickness, and medication effects. 
Adverse Physical/Mental Limitations: This category refers to those incidents 
where operational requirements exceed the capabilities of the pilot. Reaction time, and 
basic sensory and information processing limitations are examples of this classification, 
as well as the basic aptitude and mental ability to fly. 
UNSAFE SUPERVISION 
Inadequate Supervision: The role of the supervisor is to provide their personnel 
with the opportunity to succeed by affording guidance, training, leadership, oversight, 
and incentives. 
Planned Inappropriate Operations: Occasionally, the operational timing and/or 
the scheduling of aircrew are such that individuals are put at unacceptable risk, crew 
rest is jeopardised, and ultimately performance is adversely affected. 
Failure to Correct a Known Problem: This refers to instances where deficiencies 
among individuals, equipment, training, or other related safety areas are 'known' to the 
supervisor, but are allowed to continue unabated. 
Supervisory Violations: Instances where existing rules and regulations are 
wilfully disregarded by the supervisor. 
ORGANISATIONAL INFLUENCES 
Resource Acquisition/Management: Refers to the management, allocation, and 
maintainence of the organisation's resources. For example; human- selection, training, 
and staffing; monetary - cost; funding; and Equipment/facilities - design, maintainence. 
Organisational Climate: Encompasses the structure of the organisation, as well 
as its policies, and culture. Culture refers to intangible aspects of an organisation such 
as attitludes, and unofficial rules. 
Organisational Process: This is the operational procedures. Examples include 
time pressures, incentives, performance standards, objectives, and instructions. 
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Appendix B 
Defining Cognitive Error Taxonomy 
ERROR TAXONOMY 
Mechanical: no intervention possible 
Situational Awareness 'missing, fragmentary, or false uptake of objectively present 
information due to inattention, channelised or shifted attention.' 
Detection: detect cues arising from the change in the system state. 
Diagnosis: accurately diagnose the state ofthe system based on available 
information. 
Planning 'information processing errors and faulty head-work such as erroneous 
judgements, miscalculations, wrong decisions, and faulty action plans.' 
Goal: choosing a reasonable goal given the circumstances. 
Strategy: choosing a strategy that would achieve the goal intended. 
Execution/Implementation 'deficiencies in timing and adjustment of simple 
discreet and/or complex, continuous motor activities as well as perceptual motor 
confusion.' 
Procedure: execution of procedures consistent with the strategy selected. 
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Performance Shaping Factors {Person) 
Physical incapacitation 
Impaired mental state 
Excessive workload 
No training for situation 
Faulty training for situation 
Performance Shaping Factors {Situation) 
Distractions from other person 
Distractions from other source 
Interference from other task 
Unusual internal conditions (noise, vibration 
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Title: Exploring the reiationship between human error and military aircraft incidents. Projected Dates: 1 Jan 
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This research aims to investigate the relationship between human error and military aircraft incidents 
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deeper understanding of human error in a military setting. The application of HF ACS and the decisional 
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the fundamental differences between fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. More over, it is possible to compare 
decision-making and error commitment between civilian and military aviators allowing for operational 
relevance. Furthermore, we will be able to clarify the reliability and validity of HF ACS as an analysis 
tool within the aviation community. The presence (coded 1) or absence (coded 0) of each HFACS 
category was assessed for each accident description. To assess the decisional taxonomy, a judge must 
first identify the initial unsafe event and then indicate the presence (coded 1) of the corresponding error. 
For both coding exercises, only those causes and contributing factors identified in the original narration 
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